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I cannot experience your experience. You cannot experience my
experience. We are both invisible men.
– R.D. Laing, The Politics of Experience
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ABSTRACT
EXPLORING A MULTIFACTORIAL, CLINICAL MODEL OF THOUGHT
DISORDER: APPLICATION OF A DIMENSIONAL, TRANSDIAGNOSTIC
APPROACH
Mara A. Hart
July 29, 2016
Background: Bleuler saw thought disorder as the core defining feature of
psychotic phenomena, reflective of the “splitting of the psychic functions” that occurred
when, in the process of thinking, one’s ideas and feelings disconnect, becoming
fragmented and competing functions. Unfortunately, interest in thought disorder as the
conceptual core of psychosis was lost with rise of the modern DSM system, paralleling
the shift towards a more simplistic, categorical way of defining psychiatric disorders.
Aims: This study examined thought disorder from a dimensional perspective, with
the aim of disentangling qualitative heterogeneity and diverse sources of influence.
Analyses were based on a large, transdiagnostic sample (n = 322), including individuals
diagnosed with schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, and bipolar disorder. Structural
equation modeling was used to estimate the unique and combined effects of family
psychiatric history, age-at-onset, affective state, and sex on two dimensions of thought
disorder, namely idiosyncratic thinking and combinatory thinking. We also explored the
utility of categorical (i.e. DSM) diagnosis, by estimating the relative proportion of
variance it accounted for within the model.
v

Results: The overall model accounted for 11% of variance in idiosyncratic
thinking and 3% of the variance in combinatory thinking. Negative affect was the
strongest predictor of idiosyncratic thinking (r = .27), although this effect was
significantly more robust in those with a family history of psychosis (r = .37) compared
to those without (r = .02). DSM diagnosis was a significant predictor of IV, explaining
7% of unique variance when entered into the full model compared to 9% of the variance
when estimated independently, which suggests that the portion of variance explained by
diagnosis was largely independent of other predictors in the model.

Discussion: The pattern of associations among family psychiatric history, age-atonset, and negative affect that predicted idiosyncratic thinking are suggestive of a
developmental process. This hypothesis is explored in the context of previous research.
The broad implications of this research on the classification and study of psychosis is also
discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
Thought is a complex and uniquely-human phenomenon, through which our
understanding of self, world, and reality is constructed. Connected to our capacity for
language, thought is critical to communication and plays an important role in how we
understand others and make our own experiences known. Said simply, “the use of words
reflects [the] organization of the inner world of thought” (Lidz, 1973). Breakdowns in the
thought system (e.g., how one perceives, interprets, structures, and responds to
information) is intrinsically linked to difficulties with psychological wellbeing and the
ability to function adaptively in the world. At its extreme, these disturbances are the core
of psychotic experiences. In fact, disturbances in thought have been central to the
conceptualization of psychosis since Emil Kraepelin introduced the first formal
diagnostic construct, dementia praecox, which would later be reformulated as
“schizophrenia” by his successor, Eugen Bleuler.
Kraepelin’s application of a disease model to the classification of psychological
disturbances had a profound and enduring impact on the conceptualization and study of
psychosis. He defined dementia praecox as a dementing disease, characterized by a
progressive deterioration of mental functions beginning in early life. He viewed language
as an important marker of cognitive processes, describing “derailments” and
“incoherence” in patients’ speech as reflective of underlying thought disturbances.
Kraepelin acknowledged the clinical variability of dementia praecox, noting that the
“disease picture appears so varied that upon superficial observation the fundamental
1

symptoms are not recognizable” (Adams & Sutker, 2000, p. 405). While anxiety,
hallucinations, delusions, attentional difficulties, loss of interest and pleasure, and lack of
volition were common features of dementia praecox, symptoms alone had little
diagnostic significance in his system (Adams & Sutker, 2000). Despite his appreciation
for clinical heterogeneity, Kraepelin believed that a precise taxonomy of
psychopathology would lead to the identification of discrete disease processes.
Bleuler sought to refine the dementia praecox construct, describing the
dimensional nature of psychotic phenomena, which he viewed as existing on a continuum
with normal experience. He conceptualized “schizophrenia” in terms of internal
psychological processes and, with this, detailed the vast clinical heterogeneity among
patients. For Bleuler, the essence of schizophrenia was in the “splitting” of mental
functions, in which the psychological force that holds together facets of the psyche—
perception, affect, memory, thought, behavior—breaks down in some way. The primary
manifestation of splitting was disturbed thinking, which he observed in the speech of
patients. He described subtle phenomenological differences in the form of thought
disturbances, detailing processes in which “the most important determinant of the
associations is lacking… the concept of purpose” (p. 15) and others in which
“associations do not become entirely senseless, but they still appear odd, bizarre,
distorted” (p. 19). For Bleuler, clinical heterogeneity was critical to understanding the
nature of psychosis. Unlike Kraepelin, he believed schizophrenia to have multiple
etiologies, involving biological, developmental, and social mechanisms, which underlay
differences in clinical picture.
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When the first Diagnostic and Statistical Manual was published in 1952,
disturbances in thought remained central to the conceptualization of psychosis. The
category of “schizophrenic reactions” was defined as “represent[ing] a group of psychotic
reactions characterized by fundamental disturbances in reality relationships and concept
formations, with affective, behavioral, and intellectual disturbances in varying degrees
and mixtures. The disorders are marked by strong tendency to retreat from reality, by
emotional disharmony, [and] unpredictable disturbances in stream of thought” (DSM,
1952, p. 26). The conceptualization and classification of disorders in the DSM-I was
rooted heavily in the psychodynamic orientation of the time and did not delineate clear
boundaries between normal behavior and pathology.
The complex and functional view of “psychoses” was retained with the release of
the second edition in 1968, as was the centrality of thought disorder. Schizophrenia was
described as a “large category” (p. 33), characterized by “disturbances in thinking [that]
are marked by alterations of concept formation which may lead to misinterpretation of
reality and sometimes to delusions and hallucinations, which frequently appear
psychologically self-protective” (DSM-II, 1968, p. 33).
Release of the DSM-III in 1980 marked a turning point in the conceptualization
and classification of psychosis. Responding to growing skepticism regarding the
legitimacy of psychiatry as a scientific discipline, the DSM-III aimed to disseminate a
common nomenclature and establish reliability of psychiatric diagnosis. The detailed
descriptions of “schizophrenic reactions” (DSM, 1952) and “the schizophrenias” (DSMII, 1962) were replaced by sets of observable, categorical criteria and rigid diagnostic
boundaries. In the interest of inter-rater reliability, hallucinations and delusions (i.e.
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content of thought), once considered “accessory symptoms” by Bleuler, were redefined
as the core characteristics of schizophrenia. Thought disorder (i.e. form of thought) was
placed under the heading of “other characteristic symptoms,” defined as “incoherence,
derailment (loosening of associations), marked illogicality, or marked poverty of content
of speech." The complexity and conceptual significance of thought disturbances was
further reduced with the revision of schizophrenia in the DSM-IV, referred to as simply
“disorganized speech.”
The transformation of the DSM over the past 60 years reflects a growing effort to
standardize psychiatric diagnosis in order to improve professional communication,
facilitate research progress, and guide treatment decisions. Unfortunately, with the shift
toward categorical classification has come the assumption of mental disorders as discrete
disease entities, an overly simplistic view of psychological disturbances that has had
unintended consequences for how we understand and study these phenomena. As written
by Jaspers (1963), “when we design a diagnostic schema, we can only do so if we forego
something at the outset……and in the face of facts we have to draw the line where none
exists…. A classification therefore has only provisional value. It is a fiction which will
discharge its function if it proves to be the most apt for the time” (p. 605).
Limitations of DSM Classification
When Kraepelin applied a disease-model to the classification of psychopathology,
it was with the expectation that defining syndromes at the symptom-level would facilitate
discovery of underlying biological causes of mental disorders. Thus, despite his belief
that dementia praecox was a disease of the brain, he accepted this as tentative until it
could be demonstrated empirically. In fact, Kraepelin was explicit about the evidence
4

required to establish nosological entities, stating that “similar disease processes will
produce identical symptom pictures, identical pathological anatomy, and an identical
etiology (1907, p. 117).” Years later, these criteria were revisited by Robins and Guze
(1970), who developed a framework for establishing the validity of diagnostic constructs.
They proposed that a meaningful diagnostic entity should: (1) represent a cohesive
clinical construct; (2) be distinct from other disorders; (3) accurately predict course,
prognosis, and treatment response; (4) aggregate in families; (5) have clear and consistent
biological markers.
Schizophrenia-spectrum disorders (i.e. schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, &
schizophreniform) and affective psychoses (i.e. bipolar & major depressive disorders) are
associated with a significant degree of clinical heterogeneity, which has long been
recognized as an obstacle to research and clinical progress. Since development of DSMIII (APA, 1980), the classification of psychiatric disorders has been based on polythetic
criteria, in which each disorder is defined by a list of possible symptoms, but not all are
needed for diagnosis. Inherent to this approach is a high degree of clinical heterogeneity
within diagnostic categories. Take, for instance, the DSM-IV (2000) construct of
schizophrenia, which is defined by the presence of any two (or more) of five core criteria
or one of three “special” symptoms. This amounts to twenty-nine distinct symptom
profiles all subsumed under the diagnosis of schizophrenia. The clinical picture of bipolar
disorder is comparably diverse, such that two patients can have the same diagnosis, but
share no common symptoms. Further, because the same symptoms can present across
multiple disorders, it is possible for individuals with similar clinical features to hold
different diagnoses.
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There is also considerable variation within individual diagnostic criteria resulting
from the reduction of broad symptom dimensions into dichotomous categories. This is
well illustrated by the heterogeneity of hallucinatory experiences, which vary in form
(e.g., auditory, visual, gustatory, etc.), tone (e.g., derogatory, violent, reassuring, etc.),
and severity across individuals, but are assumed to be equivalent in the DSM system. In
addition to the poor specificity of clinical criteria, there is also significant variability in
the onset, course, and outcomes of symptoms, which is not accounted for by diagnosis
(Wright et al., 2013). A major point of criticism of the DSM system has been the virtual
lack of evidence supporting its utility to describe behavior, predict outcomes, or guide
treatment decisions (Lillienfeld & Treadway, 2016).
Influenced by Kraepelin’s disease perspective, construction of the modern DSM
system was based on the assumption that mental disorders are discrete, biologicallydetermined entities. Despite accumulated evidence contradicting the validity of
diagnostic categories, this assumption continues to have a powerful influence on how we
understand and study psychological disturbances. Recent advances in neuroimaging and
genetics have facilitated investigation into the biological underpinnings of mental
disorders, results of which have illustrated a complex and non-specific etiological
perspective. While certain neurological patterns have been associated with schizophrenia,
effects have been small with significant variability across individuals. Similarly,
molecular genetics studies of schizophrenia have implicated a large number of associated
genes with very small effects, results which are not indicative of a genetic disorder. This
is consistent with findings from heritability studies, which support a model of generalized
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risk for psychiatric conditions instead of disorder-specific aggregation within families
(DeVylder & Lukens, 2013; Fusar-Poli et al., 2013; Rasic et al. 2013).
Dimension-Focused Approach
Progress in understanding psychotic phenomena is contingent upon the clarity and
precision of the constructs that we study. This was an area pioneered by Paul Meehl
(1955, 1962), who sought to explore the natural distribution of psychotic phenomena
without a priori assumptions about the structure of data. Meehl believed that latent
categories of psychopathology do exist, but have to be empirically distinguished from
latent continua. Others oppose syndromal classification, arguing the need for alternative
approaches to better capture clinical heterogeneity and disentangle complexity at the
etiological level.
A large body of conceptual and empirical literature has addressed the
heterogeneity problem and introduced alternative systems for classifying and studying
psychosis (Andreasen, 2007; Tsuang, Lyons, & Faraone, 1990). One such approach has
focused on the study of symptom dimensions, backed by empirical validation, including
evidence of symptom-specific heritability (Buchanan & Carpenter, 1994; Strauss,
Carpenter, & Bartko, 1974). In recent years, domain- or dimension-based studies have
become increasingly prevalent in psychological science (Berenbaum, 2013). This
approach has gained wide acceptance in the field of personality research, contributing to
an advanced understanding of the structure and etiology of personality pathology
(Krueger & Piasecki, 2001).
Dimensional frameworks also have a long history in psychosis research. In 1974,
well before release of the DSM-III, Strauss and colleagues proposed the Domains of
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Pathology model, which deconstructed six psychotic dimensions: disorders of content of
thought and perception, disorders of affect, disorders of personal relationships, disordered
speech and thought, disordered motor behaviors, and lack of insight. Reiterations of this
approach have followed, including Buchanan and Carpenter’s Domains of
Psychopathology (1980) and Peralta and Cuesta’s Psychopathological Dimensions
(2001). More recently, the domain-based approach was endorsed by the National Institute
of National Health (NIMH), who introduced their Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) in
2008, initiating a shift away from categorical diagnosis towards an empirically-driven,
symptom-based taxonomy. Despite having yet to become the dominant paradigm in
psychological science, domain-based research has yielded promising evidence,
elucidating clearer links among psychotic experiences, etiological factors, and outcomes
(Dutta et al., 2007; Leask, Vermunt, Done, Crow, Blows, & Boks, 2009; Peralta &
Cuesta, 2007; Van Os et al., 1999).
Dimensional Measurement: Capturing the Psychosis Continuum
The traditional conceptualization of psychotic experiences as categorical
constructs is increasingly refuted (Read, Mosher, & Bentall, 2004). With this, there is
growing acceptance that psychotic phenomena exist on a continuum with normal
experience, supported by the well-documented prevalence of subtle psychotic
experiences in the general population (Johns & VanOs, 2001). The continuous nature of
psychotic symptoms is purported to have etiological significance, corresponding with
models of complex risk. As support for the continuum model has become more
widespread, so has recognition of the inadequacy of categorical measurement approaches
(Krueger & Piasecki, 2001; Lenzenweger, 2010). Dimensional assessment of symptoms
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has superior validity compared to categorical approaches (e.g., rating scales), as they are
better able to capture the natural distribution of psychosis phenotypes (Dutta et al., 2013;
Esterberg & Compton, 2009). In terms of methodology, they are more sensitive to subtle
forms of pathology that may be overlooked by categorical methods. Given their increased
sensitivity to detect differences in psychotic experiences, continuous measures maximize
statistical power and enhance the meaningfulness of data. Additionally, continuous data
permit the use of sophisticated statistical techniques, which are valuable when modeling
multifactorial relationships (Krueger & Piasecki, 2001). Despite conceptual and empirical
advantages, continuous measurement is not the norm in psychopathology research.
Consequently, availability of psychometrically-established assessment instruments is
limited.
Thought Disorder: Conceptualization and Assessment
Thought disorder (TD) is a complex and multidimensional construct, reflecting
peculiarities in thinking, language, and communication. Broadly, TD is defined as any
disturbance that affects the form of thinking, including the organization, control,
processing, or expression of thoughts. Given the breadth of the construct, TD has been
defined and classified in a number of different ways. Different perspectives have placed
varying emphasis on features related to the contextual appropriateness of ideas, the way
in which they are organized, and the language used to express them.
A variety of approaches have been developed to measure TD, including
reasoning tasks, clinician rating scales, and self-report measures. Perhaps the most
widely-used medium has been the Rorschach inkblot test, which has a rich history in the
measurement of disordered thinking and been the basis of several scoring systems. The
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Rorschach lends itself well to TD assessment, as it is a relatively standardized technique
with an unstructured format that allows examinees to interpret and structure the task
freely (Singer & Wynne, 1964). Its projective nature offers a glimpse into how an
individual perceives, interprets, and responds to ambiguous stimuli. As described by
Singer, Wynne, & Toohey (1978), the Rorschach constitutes “an analogue of those many
daily occurrences in which two or more individuals attempt to establish a consensually
shared view of an ambiguous reality.”
The use of the Rorschach in assessing thinking disturbances can be traced back to
Rorschach himself, who observed a characteristic style of responding in psychotic
protocols. He described a tendency for these individuals to formulate responses based on
absurd, narrow details of the blot (i.e. ignoring typical determinants of form, color, and
shading), often ascribing idiosyncratic or personal meaning to perceptual features
(Kleiger, 1999). Building upon Rorschach’s work, Rapaport sought to develop a more
formal system for classifying thought disturbances, which he referred to as “deviant
verbalizations.” With this, he introduced the concept of “distance,” which served as the
foundation of his approach. He believed adaptive thinking was a function of the
integration of perceptual (e.g., blot features) and associative (e.g., internal ideas,
memories, feelings) processes. The relative pull of one process over the other resulted in
either a loss or increase of distance, from which thought disturbances arose. A loss of
perceptual distance reflected a tendency to see the blot as too real, while an increase of
perceptual distance was associated with an overly-symbolic view of percepts. Rapaport’s
scoring system included 21 categories of disordered thinking, reflecting disturbances in
perception, synthesis, interpretation, and expression of responses.
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Rapaport’s system became the basis for the Delta Index (Watkins & Stauffacher,
1952), the first standardized assessment to exclusively measure disordered thinking. The
Delta Index included 15 of Rapaport’s scoring categories, each of which was assigned to
a four-point level of severity. The Delta Index was innovative, in that it captured the
multifaceted and continuous nature of TD. For this reason, the scale was revised decades
later by Johnston and Holzman, who developed the Thought Disorder Index based on it.
Thought Disorder Index. The Thought Disorder Index (TDI; Johnston &
Holzman, 1979) provides a system for identifying, categorizing, and evaluating the
severity of disordered thinking as expressed in language. TDI scoring can be based on
any verbal sample, including the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS), but is most
commonly derived from verbatim responses to the Rorschach Inkblot Test (Rorschach,
1921). The Rorschach is believed to elicit greater instances of thought disorder than more
structured methods (Johnston & Holzman, 1979), such as interviews (e.g., the Scale for
the Assessment of Thought, Language, and Communication) and non-projective tests
(e.g., WAIS).
The TDI specifies 23 categories of thought disturbances, most of which are based
on Rappaport’s original classification (see Appendix A). Because TD is understood as
existing on a continuum, each category is assigned to a level of severity, ranging from
mild to severe (.25, .50, .75, and 1.00), mirroring the structure of the Delta Index. The .25
level reflects subtle instances of cognitive slippage, which are commonly observed in
healthy individuals, particularly in times of anxiety, stress, and fatigue (Johnston &
Holzman, 1986). Disturbances at the .50 level “convey[s] an impression of loss of
mooring, shaky reality contact, emotional overreaction, and distinct oddness” (Johnston
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& Holzman, 1986, p. 490). Significant instability in thinking and perceiving is
represented at the .75 level, while responses at the 1.0 level indicate a complete break
from reality.
In developing the TDI, Johnston and Holzman (1979) distinguished four
qualitative dimensions of TD based on the conceptual relatedness of individual
categories. These include:
•

Associative Looseness, in which responses appear to be driven by
internal processes instead of demands of the task;

•

Combinatory Thinking, in which percepts, ideas, or images are
joined in an inappropriate, incongruous or unrealistic manner;

•

Disorganized Responses, in which a lack of clarity of thought and
sense of confusion are displayed;

•

Deviant Verbalizations, in which word usage is odd,
idiosyncratic, or undecipherable

A subsequent factor analysis yielded six discrete factors that partially overlapped
with the original, conceptually-derived dimensions (Shenton et al., 1987). These
dimensions, named “empiric factors,” included: (1) combinatory thinking; (2)
idiosyncratic verbalizations; (3) autistic thinking; (4) fluid thinking; (5) absurdity; (6)
confusion.
The TDI is a highly sensitive measure of thought disorder and thus is able to
detect subtle disturbances in language that may be overlooked using other methods. This
is facilitated by the scoring protocol, as ratings are based on written transcriptions of
verbal samples, which allows for systematic analysis of thought disturbances, in terms of
qualitative form and severity. While this approach has clear advantages as a research tool,
it is cumbersome to administer and score, which limits its utility in clinical settings.

12

Scale for the Assessment of Thought, Language, and Communication.
Alternative approaches to assessing thought disorder have been developed that are not as
methodologically rigorous. Of these measures, the Scale for the Assessment of Thought,
Language, and Communication (TLC; Andreasen, 1979a; 1979b; 1986) is perhaps the
most widely-used clinician-rated assessment of thought disorder in research and clinical
practice. Its development was undertaken as part of the broader objective to establish a
standard set of thought disorder subtypes for inclusion in the glossary of the DSM-III.
Subtypes were identified and defined based strictly on clinical observation, with no
assumptions of underlying etiological mechanisms. This atheoretical approach was
assumed deliberately in the service of designing an instrument with high inter-rater
reliability and clinical utility (Andreasen, 1979a). The original definitions were piloted in
a small sample of patients (n = 44) and subsequently revised to improve clarity. The
severity of each item is rated on a 4-or 5-point scale, ranging from “absent” to “severe.”
These anchor points are defined quantitatively (e.g., speech behavior occurs 5 to 10 times
during interview) and are item-specific. In addition to the relative severity of each item,
thought disorder subtypes are identified as “more pathological” (e.g., poverty of speech,
pressure of speech, clanging) or “less pathological” (e.g., circumstantiality, perseveration,
blocking; Andreasen, 1986). Thus, items are not equally weighted in determination of
global thought disorder severity.
Several studies have examined the factor structure of the TLC, with mixed results.
In her early examination of the TLC, Andreasen (1979b) conducted an exploratory factor
analysis of 12 TLC items, which yielded a single “verbosity” factor, on which derailment,
illogicality, loss of goal, perseveration, incoherence, and pressure of speech loaded

13

positively and poverty of speech loaded negatively. This suggests that poverty of speech
is a comparable indicator of verbosity, although measured inversely. Nonetheless, results
were interpreted as evidencing distinct “positive” (florid) and “negative” (diminished)
dimensions of thought disorder. In a subsequent factor analysis of the complete TLC,
Andreasen and Grove (1986) reported three distinct domains, represented as Fluent
Disorganization, Emptiness, and Linguistic Control. A comparable three-factor model
was generated from an exploratory factor analysis of eight TLC items (Berenbaum et al.,
1985) and later replicated through confirmatory factor analysis (Harvey et al., 1992).
Interestingly, however, the inclusion of all 18 TLC items has typically revealed a more
complex factor structure, with six to seven distinct dimensions (i.e. Cuesta & Peralta,
1992; Cuesta & Peralta, 1999; Peralta et al., 1992). Taken together, these data illustrate
the potentially problematic impact of methodology on conceptual models.
The TLC is a generally reliable measure, with high clinical utility. Rating scales
can be advantageous, as they are well-defined, structured, and facilitate communication
among treatment providers. Further, TLC ratings can be based on a standard clinical
interview and scoring can be completed quickly. Despite these strengths, the TLC has
several disadvantages as a research tool. A general disadvantage of rating scales is that
they yield categorical data (Lenzenweger, 2010). This is particularly problematic in the
study of thought disorder, as categorical measures do not adequately capture the
continuous nature of the construct. Further, because assessing the nuances of language is
inherently challenging, ratings of thought disorder made in real-time or from memory are
susceptible to examiner bias. The TLC does not control for speech output, although
fluency has been shown to correlate with severity. Consequently, greater weight is given
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to “positive” disturbances (e.g., pressure of speech, looseness, tangentiality, etc.), as they
are directly related to increased verbal output. On the other hand, the TLC tends to
underrepresent “negative” disturbances (e.g., poverty of speech, poverty of speech
content), which are more difficult to assess through observation and comprise only 3 of
the 18 items. While the positive/negative distinction appears to be a valuable heuristic for
clinical practice, the TLC is not sensitive to different forms of thought disorder.
Diagnosis-Based Study of Thought Disorder.
Thought disorder has been the topic of extensive study over the past several
decades. Unfortunately, the majority of this research has been based on broad diagnostic
categories, results of which do not clearly inform a dimensional model. Nonetheless, it is
important to reexamine this evidence from a dimensional perspective.
For much of the 20th century, TD was widely-accepted as a schizophrenia-specific
feature and studied within this context. This perspective shifted in the 1970s, with
recognition that thought disturbances were also prevalent in mania, spurring considerable
efforts to identify patterns of thought disorder that differentiated diagnostic groups (see
Appendix B). The earliest of these studies, which assessed thought disorder using abstract
reasoning tasks (e.g., Gorham’s Proverbs Test), demonstrated that under-inclusive
thinking tended to characterize schizophrenia, while over-inclusive thinking was more
typical of mania (Andreasen & Powers, 1974; Breakey & Goodell, 1972). Using this
approach, depressed patients have been shown to exhibit deficits characterized by underinclusive and concrete thinking compared to controls, although to a lesser degree than
schizophrenic patients (Braff, Glick, & Griffin, 1983; Braff et al., 1988).
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Similar patterns were found in a series of later studies using the TLC, with
poverty of speech and speech content (i.e. negative thought disorder) common to
schizophrenia and pressured speech, tangentiality, incoherence, illogicality, and loss of
goal characterizing mania (i.e. positive thought disorder) (Andreasen, 1979b; Andreasen,
1984; Andreasen & Grove, 1986; Docherty, Schnur, & Harvey, 1988; Harvey, 1984).
However, inconsistent evidence has also been reported, with several studies finding
greater tangentiality, looseness, and illogicality in schizophrenia compared to mania
(Cuesta & Peralta, 1993; Jampala et al., 1989; Ragin & Oltmanns, 1987). Schizoaffective
patients were included in only two studies, both of which evidenced thought disorder
profiles comparable to manic patients (Andreasen & Grove, 1986; Ragin & Oltmanns,
1987). Examining differences by schizophrenia subtype, Andreasen and Grove (1986)
reported a significantly higher prevalence of poverty of speech content in patients with
hebephrenic versus paranoid schizophrenia (Andreasen & Grove, 1986).
The presence of negative thought disorder has been evidenced in patients with
primary depression, although overall TLC severity tends to be considerably lower than
that of schizophrenia and mania (Andreasen, 1979b; Ragin & Oltmanns, 1987; Wilcox et
al., 2000). Further, patients diagnosed with psychotic depression tend to exhibit
significantly greater alogia, poverty of content, blocking, and perseveration than their
non-psychotic counterparts (Wilcox et al., 2000).
A series of studies by Holzman and colleagues examined the form and severity of
thought disorder in schizophrenia, mania, and schizoaffective disorder using the TDI
(Holzman et al., 1986; Johnston & Holzman, 1979; Shenton et al., 1986; Solovay et al.,
1986). Results evidenced disorder-specific patterns of thought disorder, in which
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schizophrenia was characterized by “fluid thinking, interpenetrations of one idea by
another, unstable verbal referents, and overly concise and contracted communications
which give the impression of inner turmoil and confusion (p. 369).” Conversely, manic
thought processes were described as “loosely tied together ideas that are excessively and
immoderately combined and elaborated” with “a playful, mirthful, and breezy quality to
their productions (Holzman et al., 1986, p. 369).” Contrary to the findings of Andreasen
and Grove (1986), Johnston and Holzman reported no significant differences in TDI
scores between paranoid and non-paranoid patients.
The pattern of thought disorder in schizoaffective patients was less consistent, as
significant differences were found between those in manic and depressed states.
Schizoaffective – manic patients exhibited a high level of combinatory thinking
comparable to manic patients. However, they lacked the characteristic flippancy and
humor of the manic patients and resembled the schizophrenic patient in terms of their
frequency of idiosyncratic verbalizations, confusion, and autistic thinking. The
schizoaffective – depressed patients were similar to the schizophrenic group in terms of
frequency of absurd responses and relatively constricted protocol length. However, they
had very low levels of thought disorder overall, with TDI scores largely resembling
healthy controls. In contrast, their rate of absurd responses was similar to the
schizophrenic group.
Despite evidence of differences in qualitative form and severity across disorders,
the variability in thought disorder presentation is not fully explained by diagnostic
groupings. Heuristically, comparative studies of thought disorder consistently report
significant within-group variance (i.e. large standard deviations) in TDI total and factor
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scores, across diagnostic and control groups. This point was empirically demonstrated
using discriminant-function analysis, which found that TDI total scores correctly
classified only 63.0% of manic and schizophrenic patients (Solovay, Shenton, &
Holzman, 1986). Qualitative factors were shown to more accurately differentiate groups,
as a subset of five empirically-derived categories (irrelevant intrusions, combinatory
thinking, fluid thinking, confusion, and idiosyncratic verbalization) correctly classified
76.5% of the sample. However, when re-examined in a subsequent study that also
included a schizoaffective subsample, the accuracy rate of the same factors dropped to
57.7% (Shenton, Solovay, & Holzman, 1987).
Course and Chronicity. The course of thought disorder is highly variable across
individuals. Diagnosis has been shown to account for a portion of this variance. It is wellevidenced that thought disorder in schizophrenia is more stable and persistent compared
to schizoaffective disorder and affective psychoses (Harvey & Earle-Boyer, 1986;
Marengo & Harrow, 1988). Thought disorder in mania has been described as “reversible”
(Andreasen & Grove, 1986), as disturbances are typically severe during acute phases of
illness (e.g., hospital admission) and remit completely following treatment (Andreasen &
Grove, 1986; Docherty, Schnur, & Harvey, 1988; Harrow & Marengo, 1986; Marengo &
Harrow, 1987). Remission of positive thought disorder has also been observed in
schizophrenic patients (Andreasen & Grove, 1986), suggesting that some subtypes tend
to follow an episodic course, independent of diagnosis. Consistently, forms of thought
disorder that are characteristic of schizophrenia have been shown to have greater stability
over time, including higher-level disturbances (i.e. 0.50, 0.75) on the TDI (Metsänen et
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al., 2006) and idiosyncratic verbalizations (Braff et al., 1988; Harrow & Marengo, 1986;
Metsänen et al., 2006).
Summary. Research has consistently shown differences in the form and severity
of thought disorder across diagnostic groups using both the TLC and TDI. Broadly,
thinking in schizophrenia is characterized by odd, impoverished, and internally-driven
speech. Classically “schizophrenic” thought disorder tends to have greater stability over
time, with slight increases during acute phases of illness. The disconnected and
elaborated thinking disturbances seen in mania tend to be episodic, emerging during
acute phases and typically remitting completely with treatment. As measured by the TDI,
combinatory thinking is indicative of acute psychological distress, while “thought
disorganization” (e.g., vagueness, perseveration, inappropriate distance, confusion,
looseness, fluidity, absurd responses, and incoherence) appears to reflect a more stable
trait. It has been posited that the stable thought disturbances common to schizophrenia are
pathognomonic of underlying pathophysiology, while sporadic forms are secondary to
clinical and situational factors (Levy et al., 2010; Walberg et al., 2001).
Despite the high degree of within-subjects variability across studies, these data
demonstrate a clear association between thought disorder and diagnosis. The nature of
this relationship is less clear. It is possible that these findings reflect an association
between thought disorder and certain clinical or personal features related to diagnosis,
such as symptoms, medication, or social functioning. In this case, diagnosis contains
important information about the nature of thought disorder that warrants further study.
An alternative explanation is that thought and language characteristics play an influential
role in clinical diagnosis, thereby making evidence of their relationship tautological.
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The Significance of Affective Experience in the Etiology of Thought Disorder
Central to Bleuler’s early conceptualization of schizophrenia was the intrinsic link
between thinking and affect. For him, the core of psychosis was in the fragmented
associations among thoughts and feelings, or “splitting.” Since this time, interest in the
relationship between affect and thought disorder has continued to drive research and
clinical work.
The connection between thinking and affect was observed by Johnston &
Holzman (1979), who described exacerbations of thought disorder during times of
increased stress in both psychiatric patients and healthy individuals. Their observations
stimulated interest in the role of stress sensitivity as a marker of psychosis liability; they
questioned “is thought disorder unique to schizophrenics, or is everyone susceptible to it
if subjected to enough stress? Or does such susceptibility vary among individuals (-)
some requiring little stress of thinking to become disordered, others requiring greater
amounts, and still others remaining quite immune to such disorganization no matter what
the stress” (p. 54)? They speculated that “thought disorder reflects a predisposition in
some vulnerable people to react to stress by becoming less able to conceptualize, focus
attention, and reason logically” and “that persons with manifest thought disorder require
less stress than do normal people for their thinking to be affected” (p. 54). Unfortunately,
Johnston and Holzman never sought empirical answers to these questions. However, they
provide a compelling theory about the nature of psychopathology that has contemporary
relevance.
Perhaps the earliest study of the impact of stress on TD was conducted by
Shimkunas (1972), who found that emotionally-salient questions elicited greater thought
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disorder (as measured by global severity ratings) in schizophrenia when they had
personal relevance (e.g., “Tell me about your saddest memory”) than general discussion
of emotional topics. This area of research was later revisited in a series of studies by
Docherty and colleagues, who examined the impact of affective valence on the clarity of
communication. They introduced the concept of “affective reactivity” of speech,
demonstrating that schizophrenic patients exhibited significantly greater referential
failures during negatively valenced topics compared to positive or neutral topics
(Docherty et al., 1994; Docherty, Sledge, & Wexler, 1994; Docherty, 1996; Docherty &
Herbert, 1997; Docherty, Hall, & Gordinier, 1998). Consistent findings were later
replicated by other researchers (Haddock et al., 1995; Tai, Haddock, & Bentall, 2004).
Research on affective reactivity of language in mood disorders is limited.
However, there is evidence that negatively valenced topics exacerbate referential failures
in manic patients (Tai, Haddock, & Bentall, 2004). Depressed patients, on the other hand,
have not been found to exhibit affective reactivity of language, although their rate of
referential failures is typically higher than controls (Docherty, 1996; Rubino et al., 2011;
Tai, Haddock, & Bentall, 2004). These studies have not compared affective reactivity in
mood disorders with and without psychotic features. Familial patterns of affective
reactivity were examined in two studies, results of which indicated that the speech of
unaffected relatives of schizophrenic patients is not influenced by affective valence
(Docherty, Sledge, & Wexler, 1994; Docherty, 1996).
Although affective reactivity in schizophrenia and mania has been wellestablished, a high degree of within-group variance exists. Moderators of affective
reactivity of language have been implicated. It has been suggested that women are more
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susceptible to disordered thinking in times of stress (Metsänen et al., 2005). Further,
affective reactivity tends to be greater in patients with positive schizophrenia compared to
negative schizophrenia (Docherty et al., 1994; Docherty, Sledge, & Wexler, 1994;
Docherty & Herbert, 1997; Docherty, Hall, & Gordinier, 1998). There is also evidence
that family psychiatric history moderates the relationship between affective reactivity and
thought disorder in schizophrenia. Specifically, negative affect has been shown to
exacerbate thought disorder (as measured by the TLC) in patients with a family history of
psychosis, but not those without a family history of psychosis (Docherty, Rhinewine,
Labhart, & Gordinier, 1998). Despite compelling preliminary evidence, research
examining moderators of affective reactivity is limited. Further study is needed to gain a
broader understanding of moderating factors and replicate previous results.
Familial Basis of Thought Disorder and Affective Reactivity
Both thought disturbances and affective reactivity have been shown to have
familial underpinnings. This has been supported by evidence of an over-represented
aggregation of these traits within families (Docherty et al., 1998; Levy et al., 2010). In
family studies, psychopathology of relatives has been shown to predict the expression of
thought disorder and degree of affective reactivity, as well as the interaction between
them.
Familial-high risk studies have documented thought disorder in children and
adolescents who go on to develop psychotic disorders (Bearden et al., 2011; Gooding et
al., 2012; Metsänen et al., 2004, 2007; Ott, Roberts, Rock, & Erlenmeyer-Kimling,
2002). Further, TD is common in clinically unaffected relatives of manic and
schizophrenic patients, differentiating them from relatives of healthy controls (Hain et al.,
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1995; Johnston & Holzman, 1979; Shenton et al., 1989). Interestingly, the type of
severity of thought disorder has been shown to cluster in families (Berenbaum, Oltmanns,
& Gottesman, 1985; Shenton et al., 1989).
As the majority of these studies are biology-focused, findings have largely been
interpreted as evidence of genetic underpinnings. However, given the correlational nature
of this research, conclusions drawn from the data are largely speculative. Adoption
studies have helped to disentangle the genetic and environmental contributions to TD.
Wahlberg and colleagues (1997) examined the likelihood of TD in adoptees, based on
genetic-risk (presence or absence of psychotic disorder in biological mother) and
communication deviance (CD) in adopted parents. Results suggested a significant
interaction effect, with high-risk adoptees in high CD environments exhibiting the
greatest TD. Interestingly, high-risk adoptees in low CD families had significantly lower
TD, suggesting potential protective effects of environment. Results of have demonstrated
co-familiality of TD independent of shared environmental factors. In a subsequent study,
Wahlberg and colleagues (2000) replicated these results using the TDI, finding that the
interaction between high-risk status and CD in adopted parents distinctly predicted
idiosyncratic thinking in adoptees.
Taken together, results from family and adoption studies suggest that both genetic
and environmental influences are involved in the development of TD. The familial basis
of TD has also been demonstrated from a social-learning perspective. The seminal work
of Singer and Wynne (1965) provides compelling support for the role of familial
communication patterns in shaping the development of TD and psychosis. Their Family
Studies research program at the NIMH grew out of Wynne’s earlier hypothesis about the
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social-transactional nature of thought disorder, specifically that “the fragmentation of
experience, the identity diffusion, the disturbed modes of perception and communication,
and certain other characteristics of the acute reactive schizophrenic's personality structure
are to a significant extent derived, by processes of internalization, from characteristics of
the family social organization. Also internalized are the ways of thinking and of deriving
meaning, the points of anxiety, and the irrationality, confusion, and ambiguity that were
expressed in the shared mechanisms of the family social organization (Wynne, 1958).”
Their research explored how unusual ways in which parents perceived,
interpreted, and reasoned about the world interfered with their ability to establish shared
attention and construct mutual meaning with their children. Wynne and Singer posited
that these disturbed social interactions compromised the child’s development of cohesive,
stable mental representations of the self and world, thereby putting them at increased risk
of psychosis. To study this, they devised a system for classifying and scoring dimensions
of communication deviance based on verbal responses to projective tests (i.e. the
Thematic Apperception Test and Rorschach).
From this, they identified a pattern of CD that reliably predicted the later
emergence and severity of psychosis in children, broadly characterized by vague,
fragmented, and contradictory communicating. Interestingly, subtle hindrances to shared
meaning were more detrimental to the listener (i.e. psychologically) than overt
disruptions. This pattern was defined by several CD categories, including: (1) closure
problems, in which the speaker leaves the story hanging or fails to acknowledge a major
perceptual element of the stimulus (e.g., "Well, this could be the son of this elderly lady
who's… looks as though he's told his mother, if that’s his mother, some distressing news
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about something"); (2) disruptive behavior, in which the speaker interrupts the task, by
asking irrelevant questions or attributing personal, self-referential meaning to the stimuli
(e.g., “Reminds me of my son contemplating whether he should play the guitar or not...”);
(3) peculiar language and logic, in which the speaker uses odd phrasing, peculiar
reasoning, or repetitiveness (e.g., “Maybe it isn't his mother because he wearing an
overcoat”).
Collectively, this research suggests that certain forms of TD are part of a
developmental process, involving both biological and environmental influence. However,
the relative effects of these mechanisms, and the nature of their interactions is unclear.
Moderators and Correlates of Thought Disorder
Demographic Factors.
Age and Gender. Few studies have examined the effects of age and gender on
thought disorder presentation. Harvey and colleagues (1997) examined thought disorder
(TLC) in a cross-sectional study of schizophrenic patients, who ranged in age from 19 to
96. Poverty of speech was more prevalent and severe in older adults (i.e. > 64), while
“disconnected” speech (e.g., circumstantiality, loss of goal, incoherence, derailment, etc.)
tended to characterize younger patients. In a younger sample (M = 32.59), Spohn and
colleagues (1986) found that thought disorder severity (TDR) increased with age (r =
.323, p < .01). Taken together, it is possible that the severity of thought disorder increases
across young adulthood and begins to attenuate in later life. However, these studies do
not account for age-at-onset and chronicity of illness, which could affect cross-sectional
relationship of thought disorder and age.
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Evidence on the relationship between gender and thought disorder has been
mixed. Several studies have found thought disorder to be similar in men and women
(Atalay & Atalay, 2006; Johnston & Holzman, 1979; Perry et al., 1995). While a
significant correlation between TDR and gender (women exhibited higher TD) was
evidenced by Spohn and colleagues (1986), this association attenuated significantly after
controlling for duration of lifetime hospitalizations and global symptom severity. This
could suggest that clinical factors mediate the effect of gender on TDI; however, this
relationship may also be an artifact of sampling bias, as the proportion of women (27%)
was considerably less than that of men.
Race, Social Class, and Education. Several studies have examined effect of
cultural factors on the measurement of thought disorder. Haimo and Holzman (1979)
found that total TDI scores did not differ across race, regardless of whether ratings were
based on Rorschach (TDR) or WAIS (TDw) protocols. This suggests that the TDI
differentiates characteristics of cultural dialect from thought disorder. The relationship
between socioeconomic status (SES) and TD was less clear. In both schizophrenia and
control groups, SES was positively correlated with TDR scores. SES was similarly related
to TDw scores in the schizophrenia group; however, in the control group, lower SES was
associated with higher TDw scores. The explanation for this inconsistency is unclear.
However, findings suggest that TDI scores based on the WAIS may be more sensitive to
SES than scores based on the Rorschach. These results can be compared to the findings
of Mazumdar and colleagues (1994) who found that poverty of speech on the TLC was
over-represented in subjects from a rural compared to non-rural background. Higher
educational status was related to more frequent instances of distractible speech,
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illogicality, clanging, and neologisms, while perseveration was more common in less
educated subjects. Although not assessed formally, it is possible that verbal output is
greater in groups with higher education and SES, in turn contributing to a higher
frequency of disturbances. Overall, demographic features do not appear strongly related
to the severity of thought disorder, particularly when using TDR scores.
Clinical Factors.
Medication. The efficacy of neuroleptic medication on thought disorder severity
has been evidenced by several studies. Hurt and colleagues (1983) assessed changes in
TDR scores in patients with schizophrenia who were randomly assigned to receive a high
or low dose of haloperidol, placebo, or no treatment. While thought disorder remained
stable in both comparison groups across the study period, patients in the treatment
condition exhibited a significant reduction in TDR scores. Specifically, they showed a
rapid improvement within the first three days, with the rate of change lessening as the
study period progressed. Despite the notable reduction in TDR scores, thought disorder
remained evident in the drug-treated groups at discharge. A notable limitation of this
study was the administration of only three cards of Rorschach, on which the reliability
and validity of TDI is unestablished. In a later study, Spohn and colleagues (1986)
demonstrated a reduction in TDR severity with haloperidol over a 10-week period, with
residual symptoms persisting throughout the study period. Post-hoc analyses revealed
that severe forms of thought disorder were more responsive to treatment, while low level
pathology tended to remain stable. Between-subjects variability was also evidenced by
Gold and Hurt (1990) in a randomized-control trial of haloperidol. While thought
disorder improved over the 10-week study period, there was significant variability in the
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rate of change across patients, which was not explained by baseline severity level. As
posited by Spohn and colleagues, certain forms of thought disorder may be more
responsive to treatment than others. However, there is also evidence that neuroleptic
medication causes a significant reduction in verbal productivity (Bilder et al., 1992),
suggesting that the treatment-related reduction in thought disorder may be a function of
decreased verbal output.
Unfortunately, potential mediators and moderators of psychotropic treatment
response have not been formally examined. Further, there is limited research on the
effects of other medications on thought disorder, including second generation
antipsychotics. A significant treatment effect has been evidenced in a small sample
receiving various combinations of typical and atypical antipsychotics, as well as mood
stabilizers and anticholinergics (Goldberg, Dodge, Aloia, Egan, & Weinberger, 2000).
However, this study did not examine the comparative effects of each drug. Levy et al.
(1993) demonstrated that methylphenidate significantly increased thought disorder
severity (TDI) in schizophrenic patients, but had no effect on healthy controls. However,
a combination of chlorpromazine and methylphenidate has been shown to significantly
improve language performance and verbal fluency (Bilder et al., 1992).
Psychiatric Symptoms. Research on the covariance of thought disorder and other
symptom dimensions has been inconclusive. Results of factor-analytic studies have been
highly variable, with TD loading onto positive (i.e. hallucinations and delusions;
Andreasen & Olsen, 1982) and disorganized (i.e. bizarre behavior, inappropriate affect;
Picardi et al., 2012) factors, as well as an independent domain (Leask et al., 2009). It is
unclear whether these inconsistencies are a function of methodological bias or reflect
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actual variation. However, the use of categorical data in these studies could obscure the
true latent structure of symptoms. Several correlational studies have examined
relationships among thought disorder and other symptom domains. Harrow and Marengo
(1986) found that thought disorder severity was positively correlated with delusions and
unrelated to hallucinations in patients with schizophrenia, non-schizophrenia psychoses,
and non-psychotic disorders. Thought disorder has also been shown to correspond
longitudinally with clinician-rated scores on the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale, namely
thought disorder (i.e. hallucinations, unusual thought content, and conceptual
disorganization) and hostility-suspicion subscales (Hurt, Holzman, & Davis, 1983).
Cuesta and Peralta (1993) found global symptomatology (Strauss-Carpenter Scale) was
associated with poverty of speech, poverty of speech content, and blocking on the TLC.
Illness Duration. Changes in thought disorder have been evidenced in relation to
the course of illness. Johnston and Holzman (1979) found differences in TDR among
recent-onset and chronic schizophrenia patients. The chronically ill group exhibited more
severe thought disorder, with considerably more absurd and incoherent responses.
Thought disorder severity has been shown to increase as a function of illness duration
(Maeda et al., 2007; Spohn et al., 1986) as well as number of hospitalizations (Marengo
& Harrow, 1997; Spohn et al., 1986). However, inconsistent evidence also exists. For
instance, Cuesta and Peralta (1993) found that rate of hospitalization was associated with
perseveration on the TLC, but unrelated to all other items. This null finding may be a
function of measurement approach, as the restricted range of TLC ratings could obscure
true relationships. Collectively, these studies imply that the severity of TD may increase
across the course of chronic illness. However, these data are drawn from cross-sectional
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research, which makes it difficult to draw conclusions about the longitudinal course of
thought disorder.
Summary
Thought disorder is a complex and dimensional phenomenon. Akin to its clinical
presentation, the etiology of TD is presumed to be similarly diverse, involving
interactions among biological, environmental, and psychological factors. Although
genetic and neurological underpinnings have been implicated, a precise pathogenic model
of thought disorder remains elusive. Efforts to isolate pathophysiological mechanisms are
likely confounded by sources of thought disorder variability that are not biologicallybased. Thus, explaining the relative contributions of environmental predictors is critical
to the search for neurobiological mechanisms. While demographic, developmental,
clinical, and state-related factors have all been shown to influence thought disorder, the
combined effects of these predictors have not been examined. Thus, future research on
integrative models of thought disorder is needed to better explain variability at the
clinical level and, in turn, inform etiological mechanisms.
The familial transmission of thought disorder is well-established empirically,
suggesting a strong genetic component involved in its etiology. Further study of the
familiality of thought disorder would greatly enhance the search for susceptibility genes.
In light of accumulated evidence of shared risk among psychiatric disorders (Aukes et al.,
2012, Mortensen et al., 2010), examining dimensional systems of classifying family
history, which account for variability in diagnosis and sub-clinical symptomatology (e.g.,
depression that does not cross the threshold of major depressive disorder) is warranted.
Capturing the complexity of family history may provide a clearer picture of the familial
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aggregation of thought disorder and help to distinguish genetic from environmental
mechanisms.
In sum, in order to gain a clearer understanding of psychotic phenomena, we must
regain an appreciation for the “richness of psychopathology” (Brockington, 1992). The
incorporation of dimensional conceptualizations of psychosis into theoretical and
empirical paradigms is critical to this aim. Research into the correlates and moderators of
dimensional constructs, including demographic and psychological factors, is critically
needed. Approaching research from a dimensional perspective has the potential to
promote a more complex understanding of psychosis.
Study Purpose and Hypotheses
Bleuler saw thought disorder as the core defining feature of psychotic phenomena,
reflective of the “splitting of the psychic functions” that occurred when, in the process of
thinking, one’s ideas and feelings disconnect, becoming fragmented and competing
functions. Unfortunately, interest in thought disorder as the conceptual core of psychosis
was lost with rise of the modern DSM system, paralleling the shift towards a more
simplistic, categorical way of defining psychiatric disorders.
This study sought to explore thought disorder from a dimensional perspective,
with the aim of disentangling qualitative heterogeneity and diverse sources of influence
transdiagnostically. The two primary objectives were to: (1) to demonstrate the feasibility
and comparative utility of a dimensional approach to psychopathology research; (2) to
examine a multifactorial, integrative model of thought disorder in a large, transdiagnostic
sample (i.e. schizophrenia, schizoaffective, and bipolar disorder). Specifically, the direct,
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indirect, and combined effects of a diverse set of empirically-supported predictors were
examined, which include family psychiatric history, sex, age-at-onset, and affective state.
Overview of Proposed Model
The path diagram presented in Figure 1 illustrates the hypothesized relationships
among predictors. The model reflects a hybrid approach, which integrates categorical and
dimensional frameworks. This approach has been recommended by several authors as a
strategy for comparing dimensional and categorical classification (Krueger & Piasecki,
2002; Peralta & Cuesta, 2003). The inclusion of categorical diagnosis as an independent,
between-subjects variable is warranted for several reasons. First, because the domainspecific approach has not yet been empirically-validated, examining the relationship
between symptom dimensions and traditional diagnoses is informative (NIMH, 2009).
This strategy is also valuable from a conceptual standpoint, as it enables integration and
evaluation of existing research findings within a dimensional framework. The proposed
model connects two primary domains of extant literature: (1) factors that explain
heterogeneity at the diagnostic level and (2) factors that explain heterogeneity at the
domain level (i.e. thought disorder).

32

Figure 1
Proposed Structural Equation Model

Family history is a predictor of proband diagnosis, reflecting evidence of
symptom aggregation within families (Aukes et al., 2012; Rasic et al., 2013). Age-atonset is also influenced by family history, supported by evidence of earlier onset of
schizophrenia and bipolar illness in probands with a family history of psychosis
(Gorwood et al., 1995). However, this relationship is moderated by sex. In non-familial
cases, onset is earlier in men than women, while no sex differences are evident in familial
psychosis cases (Esterberg & Compton, 2012; Gorwood et al., 1995; Malaspina et al.,
2000). Sex also moderates the association between family history and diagnosis, as the
prevalence of affective and psychotic disorders tends to be higher in the relatives of
women compared to men (Atalay & Atalay, 2006; Sham et al., 1994).
The second part of the model illustrates correlates and moderators of thought
disorder. A direct path is depicted between family history and thought disorder, reflecting
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evidence of familial transmission. Family history and thought disorder are also associated
indirectly through diagnosis. Although not conceptually meaningful, the examination of
diagnosis as a mediator provides a comparison between categorical and dimensional
frameworks by explaining the proportion of variance in thought disorder independently
explained by diagnosis.
Affective state is also included as a predictor of TD, with positive and negative
affect differentially influencing idiosyncratic verbalizations and combinatory thinking.
Positive and negative affect mediate the relationships between family history and thought
disorder domains. This reflects evidence that patients with a family history of psychosis
exhibit greater exacerbations of thought disorder in response to negative affect.
Primary Research Questions
(1) To what extent is variability in thought disorder explained by affective state?
Hypotheses:
1a. Higher positive affect will be associated with increased combinatory
thinking.
1b. Greater negative affect will be associated with more severe
idiosyncratic verbalizations.
(2) To what extent does family psychiatric history explain variability in clinical
presentation?
Hypotheses:
2a. Probands with a family history of psychosis will have significantly
higher scores on the idiosyncratic verbalizations factor.
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2b. family history will be a significant predictor of affective valence;
probands with family history of psychosis will have significantly
lower positive affect than those without.
2c. The direct effect of family history on thought disorder will be
partially mediated by affective state (i.e. valence/intensity)
(3) What is the comparative utility of categorical diagnoses within a dimensional and
multifactorial model?
Hypotheses:
3a. Variance in TD will be inadequately explained by DSM diagnosis
alone.
3b. Accounting for family history, age-at-onset, and affective state will
significantly improve the explanatory power of diagnosis.
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METHODS
Description of Dataset
Data for the proposed study were drawn from a larger project on co-familial traits
in psychotic disorders collected by Dr. Deborah Levy at the Psychology Research
Laboratory / Mailman Research Center at McLean Hospital. The full dataset includes
patients with schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, and bipolar psychosis, their firstdegree relatives, and healthy controls. Authorization to share data was granted by the
Institutional Review Boards at both McLean Hospital and the University of Louisville.
Analyses were conducted on a subsample of patients (n = 322) with schizophrenia
(n = 79), schizoaffective disorder (n = 140), and bipolar psychosis (n = 103) who entered
into the study between 1996 and 2010. Data collected through assessment of their firstdegree relatives (n = 439) were coded and included in the analysis.
At the time of data collection, written informed consent was obtained from all
study participants in accordance with the IRB guidelines of McLean Hospital. Probands
(PRO) were recruited from an outpatient mental health clinic; those included in the study
met DSM-IV criteria for schizophrenia (SZ), schizoaffective disorder (SZA), or bipolar
disorder with psychotic features (BP). The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV
Disorders (SCID; Spitzer, Williams, Gibbon, & First, 1994) was administered to all
participants by a trained interviewer. Consensus diagnoses were made by experienced
clinicians based on information obtained from the SCID, in conjunction with available
hospital records. All probands who participated in the study met the following inclusion
criteria:
(1) Age 18 to 65-years-old
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(2) No diagnosed central nervous system disease
(3) No substance abuse within the past year
(4) Estimated verbal IQ ≥ 70 based on the Vocabulary subtest of the WAIS-R
(5) Fluent English speaker
(6) Absence of tardive dyskinesia
Measures
Thought Disorder. The Thought Disorder Index (TDI; Johnston & Holzman,
1979) provides a system for identifying, categorizing, and evaluating the severity of
disordered thinking as expressed in language. TDI scoring can be based on any verbal
sample, including the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS), but is most commonly
derived from verbatim responses to the Rorschach Inkblot Test (Rorschach, 1921). The
Rorschach is believed to elicit greater instances of thought disorder than more structured
methods (Johnston & Holzman, 1979), such as interviews (e.g., TLC) and non-projective
tests (e.g., WAIS).
As presented in Appendix A, the TDI includes 23 categories of thought
disturbances, most of which were originally defined by Rappaport that fall along a
continuum of severity, ranging from mild to severe (.25, .50, .75, and 1.00). The .25 level
reflects subtle instances of cognitive slippage, which are commonly observed in healthy
individuals, particularly in times of anxiety, stress, and fatigue (Johnston & Holzman,
1986). Disturbances at the .50 level “convey[s] an impression of loss of mooring, shaky
reality contact, emotional overreaction, and distinct oddness” (Johnston & Holzman,
1986, p. 490). Significant instability in thinking and perceiving is represented at the .75
level, while responses at the 1.0 level indicate a complete break from reality.
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A global score can be estimated by summing all instances of thought disorder,
weighted by severity level. Johnston and Holzman (1979) developed the following
formula for calculating total TDI scores on the Rorschach (TDR):
TDR =

0.25 (A )+0.50 (B )+ 0.75 (C )+1.00 (D)
× 100
Total # Rorschach Responses

The weighted sum of scores is divided by the total number of Rorschach
responses to control for verbal productivity and multiplied by 100. The authors chose to
control for verbal output using number of responses, as it correlated similarly with
weighted sum of scores as the exact word count and is less demanding to calculate
(Holzman, Shenton, & Solovay, 1986).
Reliability. TDI total score has been shown to have good inter-rater reliability,
with correlations ranging from .80 to .93 (Coleman et al., 1993; Johnston & Holzman,
1979; Solovay et al., 1987) and an intra-class correlation (ICC) of .74 (Coleman et al.,
1993). Inter-rater reliability estimates for severity ranged from .86 to .93 (ICC = .77) at
the .25 level, .56 to .75 (ICC = .72) at the .50 level, and .50 to 1.0 at the.75-level (ICC =
.77) (Coleman et al., 1993). Due to low frequency of responses at the 1.0 level,
correlations could not be calculated. In terms of qualitative factors, ICCs were .86 for
Irrelevant Intrusions, .76 for Combinatory Thinking and .58 for Idiosyncratic
Verbalizations. Confusion and Fluid Thinking factors could not be calculated due to low
frequency of related responses. It was noted that larger discrepancies among rating teams
were found in more disordered protocols due to the number of individual scores assigned.
Factor Structure. The theoretical foundation of the TDI encompasses four
qualitative dimensions of thought disorder, each defined by a subset of conceptually
related categories. These domains include: (1) associative looseness, in which responses
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appear to be driven by internal processes instead of demands of the task; (2) combinatory
thinking, in which percepts, ideas, or images are joined in an inappropriate, incongruous
or unrealistic manner; (3) disorganized responses, in which a lack of clarity of thought
and sense of confusion are displayed; (4) deviant verbalizations, in which word usage is
odd, idiosyncratic, or undecipherable (Solovay, Shenton, & Holzman, 1987, p. 18).
Unfortunately, the theoretical structure proposed by Johnston and Holzman (1979) has
never been tested empirically.
The factor structure of the TDI has been examined in only one study. Solovay and
colleagues (1987) conducted a principle components analysis in a small sample (n = 97)
of patients with schizophrenia and mania. The resulting model specified six factors,
which were labeled: (1) combinatory thinking; (2) idiosyncratic verbalizations; (3)
autistic thinking; (4) fluid thinking; (5) absurdity; (6) confusion (Shenton et al., 1987).
The idiosyncratic verbalizations factor, which was comprised of peculiar and queer
responses accounted for the largest proportion of variance (17.7%). This was followed by
the combinatory thinking factor (9.2%), which subsumed playful confabulations,
incongruous combinations, flippancy, and fabulized combinations. While the names of
these factors are shared with the original, conceptually-based domains, their definitions
are not equivalent.
Affective State. Positive and negative affect was measured through lexical
analysis of transcribed Rorschach protocols using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count
(LIWC, Pennebaker, 2001). The LIWC is an automated program that quantifies the
proportion of words in a given text that fall into a set of pre-defined dimensions, which
tap into various psychological processes (e.g., cognition, affect, personality), content
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areas (e.g., food, space, family), and parts of speech (e.g., pronouns, articles, past tense).
At the core of the program is the LIWC dictionary, which defines the composition and
structure of linguistic dimensions. The dictionary was initially constructed within the
context of exploring written expression of emotion, but has since undergone several
revisions and expansions. The most recent version, LIWC2007, recognizes over 4,000
words and word stems that reflect 72 linguistic categories.
The LIWC calculates several affect variables, which are arranged hierarchically.
The overarching category, affective processes (915 words), is the sum of two discrete
dimensions: positive affect (e.g., love, nice sweet; 406 words) and negative affect (e.g.,
hurt, ugly, nasty; 499 words). Negative affect is comprised of three narrower categories:
(1) anxiety (e.g., worried, fearful, nervous; 91 words); (2) anger (e.g., hate, kill, annoyed;
184 words); (3) sadness (e.g., crying, grief, sad; 101 words). While subcategories of
positive affect (i.e. optimism, positive feeling) were included in the original dictionary,
they were excluded from the latest revision due to low base rates. The remaining affect
dimensions have been shown to be reliable indices. Pennebaker et al. (2007)
demonstrated strong internal consistency of words within each affect category, with
Cronbach alpha statistics ranging from .87 (anxiety) to .97 (positive emotion).
The external validity of affect dimensions has also been evidenced. Pennebaker &
Francis (1996) found a high degree of correspondence between LIWC scales and related
ratings assigned by four independent judges. Strong correlations were reported for
positive (r = .41) and negative (r = .31) affect, as well as subcategories of anxiety (r =
.38) and anger (r = .22). However, there was significant discrepancy between LIWC and
judges’ ratings of sadness. The LIWC counts of affective processes have also been
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shown to accurately capture responses to emotionally-provocative stimuli (Kahn et al.,
2007). The LIWC has been used extensively in psychological research. This approach
has been valuable for exploring affective processes in psychotic disorders, as cognitive,
communicative, and symptomatic factors are known to confound self-reported measures
of emotion (Cohen et al., 2008).
In the current study, the LIWC was used to quantify the proportion of negative
and positive affect words in transcribed Rorschach protocols. This methodology allowed
for evaluation of affect and TD based on the same responses. All administrations were
tape recorded and later transcribed verbatim by a professional transcriptionist with
considerable experience working with Rorschach protocols. To prepare for LIWC
analysis, electronic transcripts were edited to include only text that was spoken by the
patient (i.e. examiner instructions/queries, transcriptionist notes were removed).
Transcripts were then entered into the LIWC program to calculate the proportion of
negative and positive affect words. Because the word “like” is used frequently in
Rorschach responses when describing the blot (e.g., “It looks like”), we chose to remove
it from the LIWC dictionary to control for erroneous inflation of the positive affect
scores.
Family Psychiatric History. Two methods were used to collect family history
data: (1) direct diagnostic evaluation of relatives (i.e. family study); (2) informant-reports
of psychiatric histories of all known relatives, collected through interviews with one or
more relatives and probands who were able to do so. Relatives who participated in the
study were administered the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV by experienced
interviewers. The SCID has been shown to be a highly consistent instrument, with
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excellent inter-rater (Skre et al., 1991) and test-retest reliability (Williams et al., 1992).
Further, it has high specificity for most diagnoses, with the exception of substance use
and antisocial personality disorders, which tend to be underreported (Andreasen et al.,
1977).
Axis I conditions were diagnosed by consensus of expert clinicians, based on
interview information and available medical records. The presence of Cluster A
personality disorders (paranoid, schizoid, schizotypal) were evaluated in the same manner
and classified into one of three groups: (1) Definite (DEF), full criteria were met; (2)
Probable (PROB), 3 to 4 criteria were met; (3) Possible (POSS), 1 to 2 criteria were met.
The Family Informant Schedule and Criteria (FISC; Mannuzza & Fyer, 1990) was
used to collect family history data. The FISC is a structured interview used to determine
the presence of DSM diagnoses in family members, based on information provided by
one or more informants. The interview process begins by identifying all of the probands
first- and second-degree relatives, which helps to increase efficiency and accuracy of data
collection. Information assessed through the FISC closely parallels traditional diagnostic
criteria, but tends to be less stringent to account for the lower specificity of informant
reports.
The family history method has been shown to reliably diagnose most disorders
when a structured interview, such as the FISC, is used. Andreasen et al. (1977)
demonstrated good inter-rater reliability for psychotic and mood disorders, with kappa
coefficients ranging from .80 to 1.0. A later meta-analysis of seven family history studies
reported moderate to high inter-rater reliability of schizophrenia, mania, depression, and
substance abuse, while anxiety disorders were less consistently diagnosed (Hardt &
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Franke, 2007). The family history method is associated with high specificity for all
disorders, but sensitivity tends to be lower and more variable across diagnoses
(Andreasen et al., 1977; Andreasen et al., 1986; Fogelson et al., 2004; Hardt & Franke,
2007).
Broadly, this approach has greater sensitivity for broader versus narrower
categories. For example, Andreasen et al. (1986) found that sensitivity was low for
schizophrenia (31%), but considerably higher for psychotic disorders (69%). The family
history method also tends to have greater sensitivity for disorders characterized by
externalizing symptoms, such as those of bipolar disorder (59 – 100%), compared to
internalizing symptoms, as expressed in depression (50 - 62%; Andreasen et al., 1986; Li
et al, 1997). Generally, observable symptoms (e.g., mania, delusions) are more accurately
reported by informants, while subtle signs (e.g., onset, duration) and symptoms (e.g.,
guilt, self-depreciation) tend to be identified with less precision.
Although the family history approach lacks the specificity and precision of the
family study method, it is superior in terms of scope. That is, it assesses complete
pedigrees, including relatives who are deceased or unavailable, thereby providing a more
comprehensive picture of family psychiatric history.
Familial/Sporadic Distinction. The familial/sporadic distinction has been used to
distinguish differences in neurobiology, cognitive functioning, and clinical features.
Results of neuroimaging studies have evidenced differences in ventricular volume
(Reveley, Reveley, & Murray, 1984; Schwarzkopf et al., 1991), subcortical white matter
density (Zetzsche et al., 2008), laterality (Malaspina & Friedman, 1998; Roy, Flaum,
Gupta, Jaramillo, & Andreasen, 1994), and neuronal activity (Malaspina & Harkavy-
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Friedman, 2004) between familial and sporadic subtypes. Neurocognitive functioning has
also been shown to differentiate groups. Greater impairments in attention, reasoning, and
visual-motor ability are typically observed in familial cases (Erol, Bayram, Kosger, &
Mete, 2012; Hallmayer et al., 2005; Sautter, McDermott, & Cornwell, 1994; Wolitzky et
al., 2006), although conflicting data also exist (Chen, Lu, & Lung, 2011). In terms of
clinical characteristics, it is well-established that patients with a family history of
psychosis have a significantly earlier age-at-onset than those with no family history
(Esterberg & Compton, 2012; Gorwood et al., 1995; Malaspina et al., 2000). Evidence on
symptom differences has been much less consistent, as familial schizophrenia has been
associated with greater negative symptom severity (Malaspina et al., 1996, 2000;
Verdoux et al., 1996), lower negative symptom severity (Baron et al., 1992), and greater
positive symptom severity (Kendler & Hays, 1982; Roy et al., 1994; Sautter &
McDermott, 1994). While the family history method has yielded some compelling
findings, inconsistencies among studies suggest that this approach may not adequately
capture heterogeneity.
Broadening the Distinction. The subdivision of schizophrenia into familial and
sporadic cases is founded in the assumption that genetic liability to schizophrenia is
discrete. When this approach gained recognition in the 1970s, isolating a susceptibility
gene for schizophrenia was a viable research target. However, contemporary models
suggest that the genetic underpinnings of schizophrenia are highly diverse, involving
interactions among various genes and environmental factors (Svrakic et al., 2013).
Further, there is increasing evidence that genetic liability to psychiatric disorders is
shared, which refutes the notion of schizophrenia-specific risk on which the
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familial/sporadic distinction is based. Population-based studies evidence familial coaggregation of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and major depressive disorder.
Schizophrenia and bipolar disorder have the highest rate of family clustering (Aukes et
al., 2012; Laursen & Labouriau, 2005; Mortensen, Pedersen, & Pedersen, 2010; Rasic,
Hajek, Alda, & Uher, 2013), while a family history of major depression is associated with
a two-times greater risk of schizophrenia than the general population (Aukes et al., 2012;
Rasic et al., 2013).
Despite the utility of epidemiological research, the indiscriminate diagnostic
groupings (e.g., bipolar with and without psychotic features) inherent to this approach
may lead to an underestimation of familial transmission of symptoms that present across
diagnoses. Cross-sectional studies have demonstrated clustering of psychosis in bipolar
pedigrees (Potash et al., 2001), as well as familial aggregation of mood symptoms in
schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorders (McGrath et al., 2004). These findings
parallel pathophysiological evidence, as a recent study found that distinct genetic variants
cluster within families and relate to the manifestation of specific symptoms
(Hatzimanolis et al., 2013).
The significance of family history in the study of psychopathology has been
increasingly supported by genetic and epidemiological research. This evidence also
substantiates the use of family history as a clinical research strategy. However, in order to
increase predictive power of family history, the traditional approach must be revised in
accordance with contemporary evidence. Specifically, the definition should be expanded
beyond the familial/sporadic distinction to account for a more dimensional view of family
history. Presently, research exploring a broader definition of family history is limited.
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Family history of affective illness has been demonstrated as a protective factor in
schizophrenia, as it has been associated with better intellectual and neurocognitive
functioning (Anglin et al., 2009), as well as better overall prognosis (Pope & Lipinski,
1978). A significantly greater prevalence of depressive symptoms has been evidenced in
schizophrenic patients with familial depression (Babinkostova & Stefanovski, 2011;
Kendler & Hays, 1983; McGrath et al., 2004; Subotnick et al., 1997).
Coding of Family History. Despite their similar functions, the family study and
family history methods have unique strengths and weaknesses as research tools. Given
the current focus on familial aggregation of psychopathology, heuristically, we sought to
capture the breadth of family history, while maximizing methodological rigor. Thus, both
SCID and FISC data were used to define the pattern of illness in families. To maximize
the quality of data, the operationalization of family history was restricted to first-degree
relatives. Information on second-degree relatives was excluded because: (1) significantly
fewer second-degree relatives were assessed directly; (2) informant reports of family
history tend to be less reliable for more distant relatives with whom they presumably
have more limited contact.
Probands were assigned to one of four family history categories: (1) psychotic; (2)
affective; (3) mixed; (4) other. Previous research has compared affective and psychotic
family history groups, evidencing differences in age-at-onset (Kendler & Hays, 1983;
McGrath et al., 2004), symptom presentation (Kendler et al., 2004; Peralta & Cuesta,
2007; Subotnik et al., 1997), and cognitive functioning (Anglin et al., 2009). While these
findings support the use of family history subtypes, the specific criteria used for
classification have been highly inconsistent across studies. Because the relative utility of
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these different approaches has not been established, we chose to examine two separate
definitions of family history, one that employs stringent criteria to maximize the
specificity of diagnostic categories (Narrow) and a second that has lower thresholds for
group inclusion and thus has greater sensitivity. Specific criteria for each system are
outlined in Table 1.
Table 1
Family History Classification Criteria for Narrow and Broad Approaches
Narrow

Broad

PSYCHOTIC
(FH-PSY)

(a) At least one relative diagnosed with:
(a) At least one relative diagnosed with:
▪ Schizophrenia
▪ Schizophrenia
▪ Psychosis NOS
▪ Psychosis NOS
▪ Delusional Disorder
▪ Delusional Disorder
▪ Schizoid/Schizotypal (Full Criteria)
▪ Schizoid/Schizotypal (2+ Criteria)

AFFECTIVE
(FH-AFF)

(a) At least one relative diagnosed with:
▪ MDD, Recurrent
▪ Bipolar disorder; AND

(a) At least one relative diagnosed with:
▪ MDD, Single or Recurrent Episode
▪ Bipolar disorder; AND

(b) No family history of psychosis

(b) No family history of psychosis

(a) At least one relative diagnosed with:
▪ Schizoaffective disorder
▪ Bipolar psychosis; OR

(a) At least one relative diagnosed with:
▪ Schizoaffective disorder
▪ Bipolar psychosis; OR

(b) Family history of:
▪ Psychosis (narrow criteria); AND
▪ Mood disorder (narrow criteria)

(b) Family history of:
▪ Psychosis (broad criteria); AND
▪ Mood disorder (broad criteria)

(a) Family history of:
▪ MDD, Single Episode
▪ Schizoid/Schizotypal Traits
▪ Other Axis I condition
▪ No Diagnoses

(a) Family history of:
▪ Other Axis I condition
▪ No diagnoses

MIXED
(FH-MIX)

OTHER
(FH-O)

Note: FH = family history; NOS = not otherwise specified; MDD = major depressive disorder;

Analysis Plan
Specified Model. The predicted model specified both latent factor and path
analysis components. Thought disorder dimensions were specified as latent constructs.
However, because the factor structure of the TDI has not been well-established, the
measurement model was tested separately, prior to estimation of the full model. Six
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alternative measurement models were tested based on: (1) the conceptually-based factors
established by Johnston and Holzman (1979); (2) the empiric factors derived from
Principal Components Analysis (Solovay et al., 1987); (3) a one-factor model. The bestfitting model was included in the structural analysis. The structural model included 10
hypothesized paths between two latent factors and five observed variables: family
history, age-at-onset, sex, negative affect, and positive affect. The model depicted in
Figure 1 has 39 estimated parameters and 40 degrees of freedom; however, the exact
properties of the final model were determined by the results of the factor analyses.
Analysis Decisions. Data preparation and descriptive analyses were conducted
using SPSS v22.0 (SPSS IBM, Armonk, NY, 2013). AMOS v22.0 (AMOS IBM,
Armonk, NY, 2013) was used to test structural equation models (SEM). Statistical
analyses were based on covariance matrices using maximum likelihood (ML) estimation,
provided the assumptions of univariate and multivariate normality were met. Latent
factors were scaled using the marker variable approach, which is suggested for hybrid
models with endogenous factors (Kline, 2011; Sass, 2011). Analyses were carried out
following a multistep process for estimating models with measurement and structural
components (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988; Klein, 2011). The testing sequence included the
following steps: (1) Evaluate whether the measurement model is consistent with the data;
(2) Respecify the measurement model with empirically and conceptually supported
modifications; (3) Test all omitted paths in the structural model and retain those that are
significant; (4) Test all specified paths and correlations; (5) Estimate the full model.
Model Fit Criteria. Model fit was evaluated based on multiple fit indices, as has
been recommended by several authors (Brown, 2006; Hu & Bentler, 1999; Kline, 2011).
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The chi-square statistic is one indicator of model fit, in which a non-significant value
indicates adequate fit. Despite its utility, the chi-square statistic is sensitive to large
sample size, multivariate non-normality, and strong correlations among indicators, which
have been associated with inflated Type I error rate (Kline, 2011). Given this limitation,
additional goodness-of-fit indices were used in conjunction with chi-square to evaluate
model fit, namely the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), and the
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA).
CFI and TLI are incremental fit indices that estimate the relative improvement of
the specified model compared to the independence (null) model (Kline, 2010). Both
indices yield estimates ranging from 0 to 1.0. The TLI yields similar estimates as the CFI
but imposes stricter penalties on model complexity. A value of .95 is generally accepted
as a cutoff for good model-fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999), while values >.90 suggest adequate
fit (Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 2004).
RMSEA is an absolute fit index that compares the specified model to a perfectlyfitting model. Estimates, which range from 0 to 1.0, indicate the proportion of variance
unaccounted for, and thus smaller values are preferred. A value of .06 has been
suggested as a cutoff for good model-fit, with a 90% confidence interval encompassing
an approximate range of < .05 – .08 (Hu & Bentler, 1999). However, RMSEA has been
criticized for penalizing models with small sample size and few degrees of freedom
(Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 2004). To offset potential bias, the p of Close Fit (PCLOSE)
statistic was interpreted in conjunction with RMSEA. PCLOSE tests the null hypothesis
that RMSEA equals .05 and thus non-significant estimates (i.e., >.05) indicate a close-
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fitting model. RMSEA can also be used to compare nested models along with the chisquare difference test (Sass, 2011).
The chi-square difference test was used to compare the relative fit of nested
models. A significant difference indicates that the more parsimonious (i.e. > df) model is
preferred. For non-nested models, comparisons were based on the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). Lower values of the AIC and
BCC indicate better model-fit, while a discrepancy of 10 or greater is evidence of a
significant difference between models (Burnham & Anderson, 2002).
Sample Size and Statistical Power. Given the complexity of structural equation
modelling techniques, the stability of parameter estimates is reliant on large sample sizes
(Kline, 2011). Unfortunately, there is no definitive approach for calculating sample size a
priori. In practice, sample size requirements are based on model complexity, although
exact guidelines are inconsistent. A generally accepted rule of thumb is 10 to 20 cases per
estimated parameter (Kline, 2010). However, there is some evidence that as few as 5
cases per parameter is an acceptable ratio, particularly when using a robust estimation
method, such as ML estimation (Tanaka, 1987). Based on these guidelines, the minimum
sample size needed to estimate the proposed model is 175, although a more conservative
requirement is 360 cases.
Preliminary Analyses.
Demographic Characteristics. The sample includes 322 individuals diagnosed
with schizophrenia (n = 103), schizoaffective disorder (n = 140), and bipolar disorder (n
= 79). Demographic information is summarized in Table 2. Participants were
predominantly white (91.9%) and had a mean age of 37.98 years (SD = 9.78), which was
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consistent across diagnostic groups, (F = 2.77, p = .064. Men (n = 163, 50.6%) and
women (n = 159, 49.4%) were equally represented in the overall sample. However, the
sex distribution differed across diagnostic groups, with a significantly lower proportion of
women diagnosed with SZ than SZA or BP. The Hollingshead Two-Factor Index
(Hollingshead, 1957) was used to assess socioeconomic status (SES) based on parental
education and income. Participants with schizophrenia had significantly lower SES than
those with bipolar disorder; no differences emerged with respect to the SZA group, χ2 =
7.69, p = .021. Compared to those with bipolar disorder, individuals with schizophrenia
and schizoaffective disorder had significantly fewer years of education and lower verbal
IQ scores (estimated from the Vocabulary subtest of the WAIS-III) (Wechsler, 1997).
Table 2
Demographic Characteristics of the Sample, Stratified by Proband Diagnosis
Age, M (SD)
Education, M (SD)
Verbal IQ, M (SD)
Sex, % male
Race, n (%)
White
Black
Asian
Multiracial/Other
SES*, n (%)
I – III
IV – V

Schizophrenia
(n = 103)
39.02 (9.62)
13.73 (2.59)
99.33 (11.96)
69 (67.0%)

Schizoaffective
(n = 140)
38.46 (9.39)
14.19 (2.12)
100.89 (11.79)
65 (46.4%)

Bipolar
(n = 79)
35.78 (10.41)
15.38 (2.39)
106.58 (11.11)
29 (36.7%)

92 (89.3%)
5 (4.9%)
2 (2.0%)
4 (4.8%)

130 (92.9%)
5 (3.6%)
0 (0%)
5 (3.6%)

74 (93.7%)
3 (3.8%)
1 (1.3%)
1 (1.3%)

84 (82.2%)
17 (16.8%)

123 (89.1%)
15 (10.9%)

76 (96.2%)
3 (3.8%)

Note: M = Mean; SD = standard deviation; IQ = Intelligence Quotient; SES = socioeconomic
status
* n = 318

Clinical Characteristics. Clinical characteristics, stratified by diagnosis, are
presented in Table 3. Participants had a mean age-at-onset of 23.49 (SD = 7.42), which
was consistent across diagnoses, F=1.28, p = .278. However, because of age differences
at the time of testing, the mean duration of illness was lower in BP compared to both
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other groups (F = 5.33, p = .005). Individuals with SZ and SZA exhibited higher scores
on the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (Overall & Gorham, 1962) than those with BP,
F=32.47, p < .001, indicating significantly greater symptom severity. Global Assessment
of Functioning (GAS; Endicott, Spitzer, Fleiss, & Cohen, 1976) scores were also notably
lower in the SZ and SZA groups compared to BP, F=55.46, p < .001. Taken together,
these results suggest that, on average, participants with SZ and SZA experienced more
chronic and severe forms illness.
Table 3.
Clinical Characteristics of the Sample, Stratified by Proband Diagnosis
GAS, M (SD)
Age-at-Onset, M (SD)
Duration of Illness, M (SD)
BPRS Total, M (SD)
Chlorpromazine Equiv., M (SD)
Medication, n (%)
None
Neuroleptics only
Neuroleptics/Antidepressants
Mood Stabilizer
Mood Stabilizer/Neuroleptics
Anxiolytic
Antiparkinson

Schizophrenia
(n = 103)
35.65 (10.01)
23.02 (6.89)
16.13 (10.15)
50.17 (15.10)
633.18 (432.34)a

Schizoaffective
(n = 140)
38.64 (9.64)
23.19 (6.75)
15.28 (9.43)
46.36 (14.23)
631.00 (609.05)b

Bipolar
(n = 79)
51.06 (11.69)
24.66 (9.05)
11.55 (9.58)
34.32 (9.20)
406.68 (741.83)c

0 (-)
27 (26.21)
24 (23.31)
0 (-)
28 (27.18)
12 (11.65)
16 (15.53)

2 (1.43)
14 (10.0)
55 (39.29)
1 (.714)
46 (32.86)
20 (14.29)
19 (13.57)

6 (7.59)
1 (1.27)
20 (25.32)
12 (15.19)
26 (32.91)
6 (7.59)
2 (2.53)

Note: M = Mean; SD= standard deviation; GAS = global assessment of symptoms
a

N = 98
N = 135
c
N = 48
b

Family History Characteristics. One-hundred and ninety-two (59.6%) probands
had at least one family member participate in the study. Table 4 provides a summary of
the relatives interviewed by proband diagnosis. The BP group had the fewest family
members participate per proband (56/79; 70.9%) compared to SZ (147%) and SZA
(139%). Interestingly, considerably more parents of SZ and SZA participants were
recruited than BP participants. A total of 400 first-degree relatives completed the SCID-I.
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Of this group, 21 (5.25%) were diagnosed with a non-affective psychotic disorder (e.g.,
schizophrenia), 17 (4.25%) with an affective psychotic disorder (e.g., schizoaffective
disorder), 77 (19.25%) with a major mood disorder (e.g., bipolar, recurrent major
depression), and 30 (7.5%) with a minor mood disorder (e.g., single depressive episode,
cyclothymia). One-hundred and thirty-nine relatives (34.75%) did not meet criteria for
any Axis I disorder. In terms of Axis II disorders, 17 (4.25%) met full criteria (i.e.
Definite) paranoid personality disorder, 16 (4.0%) for schizotypal personality disorder,
and 3 (<1%) for schizoid personality disorder.
Table 4.
Relatives Interviewed, Stratified by Proband Diagnosis
Mother, n (%)
Father, n (%)
Sister, n (%)
Brother, n (%)
Son/Daughter, n (%)
Total

Schizophrenia
40 (26.5)
23 (15.2)
54 (35.8)
31 (20.5)
3 (2.0)
151 (37.56)

Schizoaffective
54 (27.7)
37 (19.0)
66 (33.8)
34 (17.4)
4 (2.1)
195 (48.51)

Bipolar
4 (7.1)
3 (5.4)
32 (57.1)
16 (28.6)
1 (2.0)
56 (13.93)

Missing Values and Outliers.
All participants in the sample had full data for each of the 23 TDI categories.
Complete Rorschach transcripts were available for all but 7 participants; 4 protocols were
not audio-recorded (due to technical difficulties) and 3 could not be located. Because
verbatim responses are required for the LIWC, these cases were excluded from analysis.
Further, 8 participants did not provide family history information and 5 were missing
age-at-onset values. Taken together, a total of 302 participants had complete data for all
variables of interest.
TDI category scores were substantially skewed, reflecting the high frequency of
zero usage for each type of thought disorder. Thus, factor analyses were based on
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category scores that were: (1) weighted by their respective severity level; (2) controlled
for number of responses; (3) mathematically transformed using a base-10 logarithmic
function to approximate a normal distribution. Several categories could not be adequately
corrected due to extreme infrequencies (neologism, idiosyncratic symbolism,
contamination) and were excluded from analysis.
LIWC variables were moderately skewed, such that there were high
concentrations of scores near zero and several extreme values at the upper-range.
Extreme values were carefully inspected and deemed to reflect true measurement
variance; thus, all outliers were retained for analysis (a more detailed description of
extreme values is presented below). Square root transformations were employed to
normalize distributions of LIWC variables.
Variable Descriptives.
Table 5.
Descriptive Data for Model Variables, M (SD)
All

Schizophrenia

Schizoaffective

Bipolar

(N = 302)

(N = 96)

(N = 133)

(N = 73)

TDI
Total Score
20.07 (21.85)
27.94 (29.96)
19.68 (16.94)
10.41 (10.42)
Idio. Verb.
4.50 (5.03)
5.68 (4.91)
5.08 (5.41)
1.90 (3.30)
Comb. Think.
3.33 (2.85)
3.37 (2.87)
3.69 (3.10)
2.62 (2.18)
Responses
19.71 (6.96)
19.20 (8.20)
19.95 (6.81)
19.96 (5.27)
LIWC
NegAff
.388 (.381)
.424 (.537)
.383 (.306)
.351 (.229)
Anxiety
.039 (.076)
.042 (.088)
.041 (.077)
.032 (.053)
Anger
.154 (.203)
.171 (.274)
.151 (.163)
.139 (.156)
Sadness
.064 (.103)
.074 (.140)
.061 (.078)
.055 (.082)
PosAff
1.50 (.709)
1.49 (.778)
1.50 (.675)
1.48 (.686)
PREDICTORS
Age-at-Onset
23.45 (7.33)
22.99 (6.87)
23.16 (6.73)
24.56 (8.80)
Note: TDI = Thought Disorder Index; NegAff = negative affect; PosAff = positive affect

The FISC interview was administered to 398 relatives and 294 probands. Of the
130 probands for whom no relatives were interviewed, 122 completed the FISC and were
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deemed to be reliable informants. The remaining 8 probands were unable to provide
accurate responses and thus, family history could not be assessed. FISC data were
collected for 1,041 first-degree relatives, in addition to those family members who
completed the SCID. Collectively, family history information was obtained for 1,435
relatives, the equivalent of 4 to 5 relatives per proband. Using these data, probands were
assigned to one of four family history groups: (1) psychosis; (2) mood; (3) mixed; (4)
other. As described above, two classification schemes were examined, one with greater
specificity (Narrow) and one with greater sensitivity (Broad). Table 6 presents the
frequency distributions for each of these systems, stratified by proband diagnosis. As
intended, in the Narrow system, a noticeably higher proportion of cases fall into the Other
category, with fewer assigned to the Psychosis, Mood, and Mixed groups.
Table 6.
Family History Group Frequencies, n (%)
NARROW
SZA
BP

SZ
Category
(n=97)
Psychosis 15 (15.5)

(n=133)

(n=75)

15 (11.3)

6 (8.0)

Mood

35 (36.1)

54 (40.6)

Mixed

8 (8.2)

Other

39 (40.2)

Total

SZ

BROAD
SZA
BP

Total

(n=97)

(n=133)

(n=75)

50 (16.4)

18 (18.6)

14 (10.5)

4 (5.3)

37 (49.3)

96 (31.5)

20 (20.6)

27 (20.3)

25 (33.3) 103 (33.8)

27 (20.3)

9 (12.0)

74 (24.3)

32 (33.0)

64 (48.1)

27 (36.0)

92 (30.2)

37 (27.8)

23 (30.7)

85 (27.9)

27 (27.8)

28 (21.1)

19 (25.3)

74 (24.3)

36 (11.8)

LIWC Validity.
While the LIWC has been demonstrated as a valid measure of affective state in
the general population (Groom & Pennebaker, 2002), its use in psychiatric samples has
not been well-established. Further, this is the first study, to the best of our knowledge, to
use lexical analysis to examine emotion word use in Rorschach responses. Thus,
preliminary analyses were conducted to establish that the LIWC was indeed tapping into
the construct of affective state in the current sample. Specifically, we assessed: (1) the
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convergence of LIWC domains with established measures of affect (convergent validity);
(2) differences in affect scores across diagnostic groups (concurrent validity); (3) the
characteristics of extreme outliers (extreme value analysis).
Convergent Validity. Clinical ratings of depressed mood (BPRS; Brief
Psychiatric Rating Scale) and scores of self-reported social and physical anhedonia
(CAS; Chapman Anhedonia Scales) were collected for a subset of participants (N = 191).
In theory, the constructs tapped by these instruments are similar to that of the LIWC and
thus should be observable statistically. However, given the differences in content and
methodology, we expected only modest correlations between LIWC domains and clinical
measures. As seen in Table 7, Social Anhedonia was significantly associated with overall
Negative Affect (r = .199, p < .05), as well as the subdomain of Anxiety, while physical
anhedonia correlated significantly with Anger subdomain. Clinician-rated depression was
unrelated to all LIWC categories.
While this could be due to the restricted range of the BPRS Depression item, the
absence of significant correlations is consistent with previous research demonstrating that
clinician ratings of affect are divergent from measures of subjective experience and
outward expression (Halari, Mehrotra, Sharma, & Kumari, 2006). This is supported by
the current results, in which BPRS Depression did not correlate significantly with selfreport anhedonia scales. Consistent with expectations, Positive Affect was unrelated to
clinical measures of negative affect, which lends support for discriminate validity.
However, Positive Affect also correlated modestly with Negative Affect; it is unclear
whether this is indicative of poor construct validity or methodological overlap (i.e. word
count). Overall, results suggest that the LIWC is a valid measure of negative affect in the
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current sample, while further evidence is needed to determine the validity of Positive
Affect.
Table 7
Correlations among LIWC Categories and Clinical Measures
CLINICAL MEASURES
LIWC CATEGORIES
BPRS SocAnh PhyAnh
Affect PosAff NegAff Anx Anger Sad
Affect
1
PosAff
.916** 1
NegAff
.512** .165* 1
.354** .102
.674** 1
Anxiety
.361** .082
.770** .335* 1
Anger
.268** .165* .378*
.153* .160* 1
Sadness
BPRS Dep
-.076
-.076
.020
-.001 .031
.053
1
SocAnh
.112
.027
.191** .166* .123
.020
.031
1
PhysAnh
-.005
-.086
.118
.050
.179* -.070
.107
.572** 1
Note: LIWC = Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count; PosAff = positive affect; NegAff = negative affect;
Anx = anxiety; BPRS = Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale; SocAnh = Chapman Social Anhedonia Scale;
PhyAnh = Chapman Physical Anhedonia Scale
Listwise N = 191
* p < .05
** p < .01

Concurrent Validity. Construct validity was explored further by assessing
differences in LIWC scores across diagnostic groups. Because the valence (i.e.
depression, mania) and severity (e.g., criteria for duration/intensity) of affect are
characteristics that differentiate disorders, we used diagnosis as a criterion for affective
state. To increase the specificity of groups, individuals with past mood disorders (e.g., BP
I, in full remission) or current mixed episodes were excluded from analysis. It was
expected that those diagnosed with depression (i.e. SZA depressed type, BP MRE
depressed, or SZ with MDD) would have higher Negative Affect, Anxiety, and Sadness
scores and lower PosEmo scores than those without. Affective differences have also been
evidenced among subtypes of schizophrenia, with negative affect significantly elevated in
those with chronic compared to acute illness (Suslow, Roestel, Ohrmann, & Arolt, 2003).
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Thus, we expected that individuals diagnosed with chronic SZ would exhibit greater
Negative Affect, Anger, and Sadness than those with recent-onset or residual symptoms.
Mean scores of LIWC variables for diagnostic groups are presented in Table 8.
Results of a one-way ANOVA indicated significant differences among groups on Total
Affect, F(3, 287)=3.34, p=.02, Negative Affect, F(3, 287)=5.51, p=.001, Anger, F(3,
287)=4.05, p=.008, and Sadness, F(3,287)=3.95, p=.009. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons
revealed that SZ chronic group exhibited significantly greater Negative Affect, Anger,
and Sadness than the SZ and Manic groups, but did not differ from the Depressed group.
No significant differences were found between the Manic and Depressed groups.
Table 8.
Means and Standard Deviations for LIWC Affect Variables Across Diagnostic Groups
LIWC
Total Affect*
PosAff
NegAff*
Anxiety
Anger*
Sadness*

SZ
(N = 42)
1.71 (.743)1
1.33 (.662)
.283 (.211)2
.035 (.048)
.108 (.120)
.039 (.055)

SZ, Chronic
(N = 57)
2.24 (1.22)1
1.58 (.834)
.563 (.659)2
.049 (.107)
.243 (.351)
.099 (.173)

Manic
(N = 144)
1.91 (.748)
1.47 (.654)
.352 (.251)2
.032 (.056)
.143 (.161)
.055 (.074)

Depressed
(N = 48)
1.89 (.855)
1.39 (.706)
.420 (.390)
.061 (.101)
.161 (.189)
.050 (.070)

* <.05
1
SZ, Chronic > SZ
2,3,4
SZ Chronic > SZ, Manic

Extreme Value Analysis. To supplement the empirical assessment of construct
validity, we conducted a qualitative analysis of extreme scores (>3.2 SD above the mean)
on each LIWC variable. Because, in theory, these values represent the most extreme
affective states in the sample, we would expect them to be highly salient in the respective
Rorschach protocols. Table 9 presents a summary of extreme-scoring cases for each
LIWC variable. Across Negative Affect categories, extreme scores were found to
consistently correspond to protocols in which a striking degree of negative affect was
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expressed. This group of individuals exhibited a strong tendency to respond to the task in
a self-referential manner. Several described feeling frightened, saddened, or
overwhelmed by the blot, typically because of distressing personal associations. For
example, in describing a percept, one woman (#5538) stated, “When I was younger, I was
sexually abused... and this like reminds me... of… These are my feet, this is my crotch.
An’ that’s the beast in there. It’s really embarrassing.” Others gave responses that were
personalized and affectively elaborated, but had little bearing on the task at hand (see
#3726 in Table 9). There was some indication that LIWC scores accurately differentiated
dimensions of negative affect. For instance, the direct expression of fear, embarrassment,
and worry was pronounced for those with high scores on Anxiety. However, there were
other instances in which extreme-value protocols appeared to reflect generalized distress
instead of specific dimensions of negative affect (e.g., #5313). Further, the range of affect
expressed in protocols was often quite broad, with some participants exhibiting extreme
scores on more than one dimension. These observations suggest that, in the current
sample, Negative Affect is a more robust and valid measure of negative affect than the
individual subdomain scores.
Consistent with convergent and concurrent validity analyses, the qualitative
examination of extreme-values did not provide compelling support for the construct
validity of Positive Affect. There were two extreme-scoring cases in this category, one of
which did convey strong positive feelings in reaction to the stimuli (#3099). The second
cases also had extreme scores on Negative Affect, Anxiety, and Anger (#8900). This
individual’s style of responding on the Rorschach can be best characterized as
paradoxical, offering descriptions such as, “that could be something at peace or
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something at war” and “peaceful animals just show-, or peaceful people just showing
their enemies.” Despite the high frequency of both Positive Affect and Negative Affect
words, the overall tone of this protocol is negative. This pattern of scores was observed in
several other cases, whose Positive Affect and Negative Affect values were both
significantly elevated (i.e. 2.5 – 3.2 SDs above the mean), although they did not meet
criteria for extreme values.
Table 9.
Qualitative Analysis of Extreme Values for LIWC Categories
ID

Value
(z)

Rorschach Excerpts

NEGATIVE AFFECT
8900
3726

3.61
(8.50)

▪ Could be uh... somebody at war. (Um hm.) 'Cause it doesn't look happy to me... looks

3.41
(7.98)

▪ Your orders were to kill on sight and.. and level the whole Dresden country to ashes.

like it gets worse.
An' that's what they did to me.
▪ And people were using me in nineteen seventy five. (People were using you?) Yes, the

key year for the, for the battle of the planet. And.. I was caught in the crossfire of it.
5538

2.26
(4.94)

▪ Kinda looks like two people havin’ a conversation. But it’s.. mm.. bad.

Their hearts
are torn out.
▪ Well there’s two people.. standin’ there.. the part in the red.. in the red.. in the middle..
sorta tearin’ out each other’s hearts. I dunno. I could be wrong

ANXIETY
8900

.71
(8.60)

▪ These are scary, they're, they're pictur-, they're pictures of uh.. (SIGHS) That could be

something at peace or something at war, I don't know.
▪ An' the doctor do-, doctor has to probably put all, together all these... interpretations

because... isn't that a little too overwhelming to look at a-, every day, for everybody?
5538

.57
(6.82)

▪ When I was younger, I was sexually abused... and this like reminds me... of…

These
are my feet, this is my crotch. An’ that’s the beast in there. It’s really embarrassing.
That’s what it reminds me of. I’m sorry.
▪ I don’t know. I don’t know. I don’t do so well on these... I don’t wanna screw
anything up.

9318

.43
(5.02)

▪ This is scary. I’d be scared to find out what this really means. [I’m] findin’ the dark

1.80
(8.62)

▪ Well, something was on fire, but it wasn't dead, and they want like, g-, they want, the

1.58
(7.12)

▪ ...an' a man gave me a book, an' then somethin' smashed through my phone. (Hm.)

things.

ANGER
8900
3726

devil wants most, a lotta people dead.
An'.. I think it was supposed, supposed to kill. Didn't kill me. It's a very evil place.
(What's evil about it?) It's evil, just take my word.
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2371

.84
(3.43)

▪ Anonymity. (Anonymity?) Yeah. (PP) I keep seeing erotic imagery, and it’s makin’

me sick.

SADNESS
3501

1.10
(10.21)

▪ Tears... the tears were about the same distance from my eyes as the uh.. parts that

5313

.44
(3.71)

▪ Looks like two people coming together in a violent collision... looks like blood

3726

.42
(3.51)

▪ 'Cause the living EC Master.. does want, doesn't want me to have any happiness. He

looked like tears... made me sad looking at that one.

wants me kneel, kneeled down... to a rock.

POSITIVE AFFECT
8900

3099

4.09
(3.76)

▪ I liked that one, I liked that one. Completely happy, that's when you're a child, play the

3.93
(3.53)

▪ A spaceship. That's a great-lookin' spaceship. Not a Vulcan spaceship but ... definitely

violin-- ... That's a cello, an' uh.. they're tryin' to bring, if there's hate, the hate is
subdued by uh, by music.
▪ Um.. it's peaceful to me. It has color in it, lighter colors, like discord, like the fighting
is gonna stop someday.
a nice spaceship.
▪ Sounds like a parade or something. That's a good feeling that gives me. Wow. Good

feelings. I like that one. Great feelings. It's very emotional for me
Note: ID = Participant ID#, Value = LIWC Raw Score; Z = z-score; Dx = Axis I Diagnosis; SZ =
Schizophrenia; Chron = Chronic; SZA = Schizoaffective Disorder; BP = Bipolar
Text in parentheses indicates examiner comment

Summary. Taken together, results of these analyses demonstrate Negative Affect
as a construct valid measure, which taps into the latent domain of negative affect. Results
did not provide compelling support for the validity of Positive Affect in the current
sample. Given that Positive Affect has been shown to be valid in research on non-clinical
samples, it is possible that the scale functions differently in a psychiatric population.
Discrepant findings may also relate to the unique methodology of the current study, as
language elicited by the Rorschach is likely quite different from other sampling
approaches (i.e. structured interviews). As discussed elsewhere, the task itself tends to
“pull for” negative affect, which offers another possible explanation for the functional
differences between LIWC scales. Regardless of the explanation, Positive Affect was
excluded from further analyses.
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Primary Analyses
Measurement Model
Model 1. Model 1 was estimated in the full sample, results of which indicated
poor model-fit [χ2 (20) = 117.28 p <.001, TLI = .882, CFI = .916, RMSEA = .127,
RMSEA CI90 = .105 - .150, PCLOSE < .001]. Large residual covariances were observed
among measured variables. However, given the theoretical basis of this model (i.e., one
unitary factor explaining TD), attempts to respecify the model were not made.
Model 1

Model 2. Model 2 yielded marginal fit between implied estimates and observed
data [χ2 (19) = 61.93, p <.001, TLI = .945, CFI = .963, RMSEA = .087, RMSEA CI90 =
.063 - .111, PCLOSE = .006]. However, modification indices revealed large residual
covariances between Peculiar and Confabulation scores. The respecification of a
correlation between ePe and eCon resulted in a significant improvement to model fit.
However, factors were highly correlated (r = .86), suggesting that they are not separable
constructs.
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Model 2

Model 3. Model 3 yielded a fair degree of consistency between model-implied
estimates and observed data [χ2 (9) = 37.38, p < .001, TLI = .946, CFI = .967, RMSEA =
.102, RMSEA CI90 = .070 - .137, PCLOSE = .006]. Large residual covariances were
observed between eQu and Pe, which is consistent with the specified 2-factor PCA model
(Model 4).
Model 3

Model 4. The 2-factor PCA-derived model was a close fit to the observed data [χ2
(8) = 3.69, p = .884, TLI = 1.01, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, RMSEA CI90 = .00 - .32,
PCLOSE = .985]. Residual covariances among indicators were insignificant. There was a
modest correlation between factors (r = .64), indicative of related yet separable factors.
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Despite statistical support for this model, it has fewer than three indicators per factor,
which increases the likelihood of empirical under-identification, meaning that estimates
may be biased or invalid.

Model 4

Model 5. Model 5 was a poor fit to the observed data [χ2 (27) = 211.90, p < .001,
TLI = .846, CFI = .884, RMSEA = .151, RMSEA CI90 = .132 - 170, PCLOSE < .001].
Specifically, there were large residual covariances were among several indicators,
including Playful Confabulation and Flippant, as well as Absurd and Queer.
Model 5

Model 6. The specification of Model 6 was informed by estimates from the
corresponding one-factor model (Model 5), as well as results of the PCA and
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conceptually-based models. Model 6 yielded estimates that were highly consistent with
observed data [χ2 (19) = 26.66, p = .767, TLI = .991, CFI = .994, RMSEA = .035,
RMSEA CI90 = .00 - .065, PCLOSE = .767]. The correlation between factors was strong
(r = .76), but indicative of separable constructs.

Model 6

Model Comparison. Of the six models tested, there were two (Model 4 and
Model 6) that demonstrated an adequate degree of fit to the data. Statistical comparison
of these models based on AIC and BIC criteria (Table 10), indicates that Model 4 is
preferred over Model 6. The strict penalty for model complexity inflicted by these
estimates should be taken into consideration, given the considerable difference in number
of parameters between the two models. Further, Model 4 does not meet minimum
guidelines for empirical identification due to the number of indicators per factor, which
increases the risk of unstable estimates (Brown, 2006; Kline, 2011). This risk may be
exacerbated when estimated within the more complex structural model. Because Model 6
was a good fit to the data and met all conditions for theoretical identification, it was used
to estimate the full model.
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Table 10.
Statistical Comparison of TDI Factor Models
RMSEA
D
χ2
df
TLI CFI
PCLOSE
χ2DIFF (df)
AIC
BIC
RMSEA
(90% CI)
Model 1 117.28 20 .882 .916 .127 (.105 - .150) <.001
–
–
–
–
***
Model 2 54.89 19 .956 .970 .077 (.053 - .101) .031
.050 62.39 (1)
88.89 153.06
Model 3 38.77 9
.942 .965 .104 (.072 - .139) .004
–
–
62.78 119.41
***
Model 4 5.16
8
1.01 1.00
.00 (.00 - .47)
.959
.104 33.60 (1)
31.16 80.23
Model 5 205.21 27 .849 .887 .147 (.129 - .167) <.001
–
–
241.21 308.18
Model 6 26.66 19 .991 .994 .035 (.00 - .065) .767
.112 178.55 (8)*** 60.66 124.83
2
Note: χ = chi-square test; df = degrees of freedom; TLI = Tucker-Lewis Index; CFI = Comparative Fit
Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; 90% CI = 90% confidence interval; PCLOSE =
p of Close Fit; χ2 DIFF = Chi-Square Difference Test; AIC = Akaike Information Criterion; BIC = Bayesian
Information Criterion
**
< .01
***
< .001

Structural Model
The structural model included a series of analyses, which were carried out
sequentially. Specifically, we: (1) examined the comparative sensitivity of family history
groupings; (2) tested omitted paths; (3) tested specified paths; (4) evaluated the overall
model; (5) examined covariates; (6) evaluated the relative utility of categorical diagnosis
within the baseline model.
Comparative Sensitivity of Family History Coding Schemes. To evaluate the
sensitivity of family history categories to detect differences in clinical characteristics we:
(1) conducted multiple-group path analysis to test invariance of structural paths in
familial and sporadic groups, comparing across Broad and Narrow schemes; (2) assessed
the relative effects of different family history groupings on endogenous variables using
effect coding.
Multiple Group Analysis. We assessed whether differences in structural
relationships between familial (i.e. family history of psychosis) and sporadic (i.e. no
family history of psychosis) groups were better captured using Narrow or Broad family
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history criteria. Path coefficients were calculated separately for each familial and
sporadic group and the magnitude of differences were compared across coding systems.
As presented in Table 11, the relationship between Negative Affect and Idiosyncratic
Thinking differed as a function of family history using both Narrow and Broad criteria.
Specifically, greater Negative Affect was associated with more severe Idiosyncratic
Thinking for those with a family history of psychosis, but not those without. Earlier ageat-onset was also predictive of higher Idiosyncratic Thinking scores in the familial, but
not sporadic, group. While this trend was consistent across coding approaches, the
moderation effect did not reach statistical significance when using the Broad criteria.
Table 11
Comparative Sensitivity of Family History Coding Schemes
Narrow

Broad

No Psychosis Pairwise
Psychosis
No Psychosis Pairwise
(n=181)
(n=159)
(n=146)
Comp
Comp
z
z
Parameter
Est. S.E. Est. S.E.
Est. S.E.
Est. S.E.
–
–
Sex → AAO
.139 1.25 .092 1.13
.112 1.07
.099 1.32
–
–
AAO → NegAff -.019 .007 -.031 .003
-.025 .006
-.004 .003
–
–
Sex → NegAff
.012 .093 .138 .039
.063 .076
.097 .042
a, b
***
***
***
NegAff → IV
.407
.044 .036 .039 -2.63
.370
.041
-.016 .038 -3.04***
–
–
NegAff → CT
.166 .025 -.018 .046
.135 .026
-.013 .05
c
**
***
***
–
AAO → IV
-.248 .003 -.044 .001 2.14
-.171 .003
-.093 .001
–
–
AAO → CT
-.120 .002 -.053 .002
-.089 .002
-.073 .002
–
–
Sex → IV
-.129 .038 -.035 .021
-.135 .034
.001 .019
–
–
Sex → CT
-.097 .026 .019 .024
-.092 .024
.035 .026
Note: Est. = standardized estimate; S.E. = standard error; z = z-score; FH = family history; AAO = age-atonset; NegAff = negative affect; IV = idiosyncratic thinking; CT = combinatory thinking
**
< .01
***
< .001
Psychosis
(n=124)

Effect Coding. We compared different family history groupings, in terms of the
magnitude of their associations with model variables, namely Age-at-Onset, Negative
Affect, Idiosyncratic Thinking, and Combinatory Thinking. Effects coding was used to
assess differences among (1) Non-affective psychosis; Mood/Other; Affective psychosis;
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(2) All psychosis; Other; Mood only; (3) All psychosis; Mood only/Other for both Broad
and Narrow definitions of family history. Based on existing literature, we expected
family history to account for variability in Age-at-Onset, Negative Affect, and
Idiosyncratic Thinking. Table 12 presents the standardized effects, goodness-of-fit
statistics, and relative-fit indices for each of the six models estimated. No differences
were found among affective psychosis, mood/other, and affective psychosis (B1, N1)
regardless of whether Broad or Narrow criteria were used. The familial/sporadic
distinction (B3, N3) explained significant variability in Negative Affect, with higher
scores associated with family history of psychosis using both Narrow and Broad criteria.
The second family history variable, which drew comparisons among affective / nonaffective psychosis, other, and mood categories, captured no differences when Narrow
criteria were used. However, when defined by Broad criteria, this set of contrasts
explained significant variability in both Age-at-Onset and Negative Affect. Further, it
yielded the strongest correlation (albeit, not statistically significant) with Idiosyncratic
Thinking of the six family history variables. While differences in fit statistics were
negligible overall, the corresponding B2 model yielded the lowest chi-square, AIC, and
BIC values, as well as the highest TLI and CFI values, all of which are associated with
goodness-of-fit. Given these findings, all subsequent analyses of family history were
based on B2.

→ CT

χ2 (46) TLI CFI RMSEA (90% CI) PClose AIC

BIC

B1

-.052

.041 -.015 .051 100.08 .941 .959 .062 (.046 - .079) .109 164.08 283.13

B2

.118

*

-.123* -.070 .021 97.68 .944 .961 .061 (.044 - .078) .137 161.69 280.74

B3

.047 -.127* -.047 .029 98.87 .943 .960 .061 (.045 - .078) .123 162.87 281.92

N1

-.079 -.005 -.005 .051 101.47 .940 .958 .063 (.046 - .080) .095 165.47 316.52

N
a
r
r
o
w

Broad

Table 12
Family History Effect Coding
FH → AAO → NA → IV
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N2

.048

-.103 -.030 .028 98.25 .943 .961 .061 (.044 - .078) .139 162.25 281.30

N3

.040 -.139* -.067 .007 100.11 .942 .959 .062 (.046 - .079) .109 164.11 283.16

Note: FH = family history; DSM Dx = DSM-IV diagnosis; AAO = age-at-onset; NegAff = negative affect;
2
IV = idiosyncratic thinking; CT = combinatory thinking; χ = chi-square test; TLI = Tucker-Lewis Index;
CFI = Comparative Fit Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; PCLOSE = p of Close
Fit; AIC = Akaike Information Criterion; BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion
FH 1 = Psychosis (-1); Mood/Other (0); Affective Psychosis (1)
FH 2 = All Psychosis (-1); Other (0); Mood Only (1)
FH 3 = All Psychosis (-1); No Psychosis (1)
*

< .05
< .01
***
< .001
**

Baseline Model
Omitted Paths. Following the sequence recommended by Bollen (1989), the five
paths omitted from the a priori model were tested first. As shown in Table 13, none of
these parameters reached statistical significance and thus were not retained in the model.
Table 13
Estimation of Omitted Paths
Standardized
Parameter
S.E.
p-value
Estimate
AAO → NegAff
-.014
.003
.810
Sex → FH
.047
.094
.409
Sex → NegAff
.067
.044
.238
Sex → IV
-.089
.021
.140
Sex → CT
-.038
.018
.517
Note: S.E. = standard error; FH = family history; AAO = age-atonset; NegAff = negative affect; IV = idiosyncratic thinking; CT =
combinatory thinking

Specified Paths. We then evaluated the nine structural paths that were specified a
priori. Table 14 presents the standardized estimates and significance levels for each of
these parameters. As predicted, family history of psychosis was significantly associated
with earlier Age-at-Onset and more intense Negative Affect in probands. Interestingly,
although family history had no direct effect on either TD domain, earlier Age-at-Onset
and greater Negative Affect were significant predictors of Idiosyncratic Thinking
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severity. None of these variables (i.e. family history, Age-at-Onset, or Negative Affect)
explained a significant proportion of variance in Combinatory Thinking. While we
hypothesized a positive association between Positive Affect and Combinatory Thinking,
this effect could not be formally evaluated. Consistent with expectations, there was a
modest association between sex and Age-at-Onset (male → earlier Age-at-Onset),
although this effect did not reach statistical significance.
Table 14.
Estimation of Specified Paths
Parameter
Sex → AAO
FH → AAO*
AAO → IV*
AAO → CT
FH → NegAff*
FH → IV
FH → CT
NegAff → IV**
NegAff → CT
FH ↔ Sex

Standardized
Estimate
.104
.118
-137
-.083
-.126
-.074
.024
.273
.092
.047

S.E.
.838
.510
.001
.001
.027
.013
.011
.021
.023
.024

p-value
.066
.038
.026
.164
.028
.217
.686
<.001
.122
.410

Note :S.E. = standard error; FH = family history; AAO = age-at-onset;
NegAff = negative affect; IV = idiosyncratic thinking; CT =
combinatory thinking

Model Fit. The fit of the overall model was then evaluated. Fit statistics indicated
poor convergence between implied parameters and observed data [χ2 (57) = 368.93, p <
.001, TLI = .744, CFI = .813, RMSEA = .134, RMSEA CI90 = .121 - .147, PCLOSE =
<.001], due largely to substantial residual covariance among latent factors Idiosyncratic
Thinking and Combinatory Thinking. The respecification of correlated disturbance terms
resulted in a significant improvement to model fit [χ2 (56) = 142.63, p = .009, TLI = .928,
CFI = .948, RMSEA = .071, RMSEA CI90 = .057 - .086, PCLOSE = .009, D RMSEA =
.063, χ2DIFF (1) = 226.30]. Figure 2 depicts the final model, with standardized estimates and
significance levels presented for measurement and structural parameters.
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Figure 2.
Final SEM Model with Standardized Estimates

Table 15.
Model Fit Indices for SEM Model
χ2
df
TLI

CFI

RMSEA (90% CI) PCLOSE D RMSEA χ2DIFF (1)

Specified Model 368.93 57 .744
.813
.134 (.121 - .147) <.001
–
–
d.IV ↔ d.CT 142.63 56 .928
.948
.071 (.057 - .086)
.009
.063
226.30
2
Note: χ = chi-square test; df = degrees of freedom; TLI = Tucker-Lewis Index; CFI = Comparative Fit

Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; PCLOSE = p of Close Fit; χ2 DIFF = ChiSquare Difference Test

Moderating Effect of Sex
To assess whether structural relationships among variables differed as a function
of sex, we estimated parameters for men and women separately and compared them using
the Critical Ratio of Differences test. Table 16 presents standardized path coefficients for
each group. Of the nine pairwise comparisons conducted, the direct effect of Age-atOnset on Negative Affect was the only parameter moderated by sex. For men, later
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illness onset was associated with greater negative affect, while the opposite was true for
women: earlier onset predicted more intense negative affect.
Table 16
Pairwise Comparisons of Structural Parameters by Sex
Males
Females
Pairwise Comparison
Parameter
Estimate S.E.
p
Estimate S.E.
p
C.R.
Difference
FH → AAO
.111
.581 .160
.127
.845 .122
.487
.611
AAO → NegAff
.129
.069 .103
-.114
.055 .167
-2.14
-2.88***
AAO → IV
-.141
.003 .101
-.123
.001 .161
.754
1.03
AAO → CT
-.099
.002 .241
-.078
.002 .357
.390
.711
FH → NegAff
-.159
.036 .044
-.097
.041 .241
.450
.511
FH → IV
-.120
.019 .161
.012
.014 .885
1.21
1.21
FH → CT
-.045
.015 .596
.099
.016 .241
1.21
1.21
NegAff → IV
.209
.044 .020
.363
.040 .002
.409
.791
NegAff → CT
.059
.033 .484
.127
.032 .132
.542
.737
Note: FH = family history; DSM Dx = DSM-IV diagnosis; AAO = age-at-onset; NegAff = negative affect;
IV = idiosyncratic thinking; CT = combinatory thinking
*
< .05
**
< .01
***
< .001

Covariate Analysis
Because previous research has indicated age, SES, education, and chlorpromazine
equivalent as possible covariates of TD, we estimated the effects of these variables on the
baseline model. Overall, the inclusion of covariates did not significantly change the
nature of structural relationships among model variables. Negative Affect had a modest,
positive association with CPZ, but was independent of age, SES, and education. No
significant effects were found between covariates and TD domains, with the exception of
a small, negative correlation between SES and Combinatory Thinking. We speculated
that this relationship was spurious, reflecting variance in verbal fluency common to these
variables. That is, verbal fluency is strongly related to SES and was applied as a
correction to TDI category scores. Thus, we re-estimated this effect after controlling for
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speech fluency (i.e. word count), which substantially attenuated the effect of SES on
Combinatory Thinking (r = .08, p = .124).
Affective State and Thought Disorder
Consistent with our hypothesis, the intensity of negative affect significantly
predicted the severity of Idiosyncratic Thinking, but was unrelated to Combinatory
Thinking. Specifically, each 1-SD increase in Negative Affect was associated with a
.273-SD increase in Idiosyncratic Thinking, after controlling for all other variables in the
model. Said differently, Negative Affect accounted for 7.45% of the variance in
Idiosyncratic Thinking. Unfortunately, we were unable to examine the association
between Combinatory Thinking and positive affect due to validity issues with the LIWC
Positive Affect category.
Family History
The model sought to address the extent to which family psychiatric history
accounted for variability in clinical characteristics. Our prediction that family history of
psychosis would be associated with more severe Idiosyncratic Thinking was not
supported by the data. In fact, family history was unrelated to both qualitative and
quantitative variability in TD. With respect to differences in affective state, family history
of psychosis was associated with significantly greater negative affect compared to other
groups. Family history accounted for variability in Age-at-Onset, as familial psychosis
predicted significantly earlier Age-at-Onset compared to other family history groups.
Mediation of Negative Affect. To test the prediction that the relationship
between family history and Idiosyncratic Thinking would be mediated by Negative
Affect, we calculated the effect decomposition associated with the mediator. Figure 3
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shows the direct and indirect effects among these variables. The inclusion of Negative
Affect reduced the strength of the relationship between family history and Idiosyncratic
Thinking, accounting for 27.2% of the total effect. The statistical significance of the
mediated effect was evaluated using the Sobel Test, results of which indicated that the
indirect effect of family history on Idiosyncratic Thinking through Negative Affect did
not differ significantly from zero (z = -1.88, p = .059). However, because this is a highly
conservative test that performs best with large sample sizes (i.e. >500), it is possible that
there was not enough power to detect an effect.

Figure 3
Mediation of NegAff on the Relationship between FH and IV

Note: all values are unstandardized estimates; parentheses indicate
indirect effects

Categorical Diagnosis
To address hypotheses on the comparative utility of categorical and dimensional
classification, we assessed the degree to which DSM diagnosis accounted for variability
in TD factors independently, as well as its covariance within the baseline model. When
estimated as the only predictor, diagnosis accounted for 9% of variance in Idiosyncratic
Thinking, with higher scores on this factor significantly associated with a diagnosis of
schizophrenia (r = -.31). Diagnosis was virtually unrelated to the severity of Combinatory
74

Thinking, explaining none of the variance on this factor. DSM diagnosis was then entered
into the baseline model, specified as a predictor of Age-at-Onset, Negative Affect,
Idiosyncratic Thinking, and Combinatory Thinking; the direct effects of family history
and sex on diagnosis were also estimated. As found in the diagnosis-only model,
schizophrenia was associated with significantly greater Idiosyncratic Thinking scores
compared to the other groups (r = -.26, p < .001), but diagnosis was unrelated to
Combinatory Thinking. Overall, the inclusion of diagnosis in the model explained an
additional 7% of the variance of Idiosyncratic Thinking. Inconsistent with expectations,
diagnosis did not account for differences in Age-at-Onset or Negative Affect, nor was it
predicted by family history. There was a small effect of sex on diagnosis, such that
females were more likely to be diagnosed with bipolar disorder and men with
schizophrenia.
Table 17
Structural Coefficients of DSM Diagnosis within the Baseline Model
Standardized
S.E.
Parameter
Estimate
FH → DSM Dx
.095
.052
Sex → DSM Dx
.240***
.083
DSM Dx → AAO
.059
.578
DSM Dx → NegAff
-.056
.030
***
DSM Dx → IV
-.272
.016
DSM Dx → CT
-.071
.012
Note: FH = family history; DSM Dx = DSM-IV diagnosis; AAO = age-at-onset;
NegAff = negative affect; IV = idiosyncratic thinking; CT = combinatory
thinking
*
< .05
**
< .01
***
< .001

We then conducted a multigroup analysis to determine whether structural
relationships differed as a function of diagnosis. However, because sample sizes were
relatively small and unequal across groups, parameters could not be estimated and
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compared reliably. Thus, we decided to collapse the three diagnostic categories into two
broader groups: non-affective (SZ) and affective psychoses (SZA, BP). Family history of
psychosis was predictive of earlier onset and greater Negative Affect in the full sample;
however, when estimates were calculated for each group separately, this effect was found
to be specific to non-affective psychosis, as was the association between Age-at-Onset
and Negative Affect. Within the non-affective psychosis group, there were also
significant effects of family history (psychosis) on Idiosyncratic Thinking and Age-atOnset on Combinatory Thinking, which were not present in the affective psychosis
group. Due to difference in structural relationships, the model explained considerably
more variance in Idiosyncratic Thinking for probands diagnosed with non-affective
(24%) compared to affective psychosis (6%).
Table 18.
Pairwise Comparison of Structural Parameters by Affective and Non-Affective
Psychosis Groups
Psychosis
Affective Psychosis
Pairwise Comp
Estimate S.E.
Estimate S.E.
z
Parameter
FH → AAO
.167*
.718
.021
.717
-1.38
Sex → AAO
.083
.601
.159
.579
0.51
FH → NegAff
-.188*
.041
-.045
.031
1.68*
AAO → NegAff
.039
.004
-.068
.004
-0.90
Sex → NegAff
.067
.035
.143
.025
0.25
CPZ → NegAff
.182*
.000
.116
.000
-1.29
NegAff → IV
.323***
.035
.103
.054
-1.30
NegAff → CT
.147
.028
-.014
.044
-1.10
AAO → IV
-.198*
.002
-.003
.002
1.69*
*
FH → IV
-.155
.019
.129
.019
2.45**
FH → CT
-.022
.015
.109
.016
1.076
AAO → CT
-.159*
.002
.035
.002
1.589
Sex → CT
-.003
.013
-.043
.013
-0.317
Sex → IV
-.043
.015
-.100
.016
-0.382
CPZ → CT
.027
.000
-.203*
.000
-1.79*
*
CPZ → CT
.13
.000
-.199
.000
-2.74***
Note: FH = family history; AAO = age-at-onset; NegAff = negative affect; IV =
idiosyncratic thinking; CT = combinatory thinking; CPZ = chlorpromazine equivalent
*
< .05
**
< .01
***
< .001
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Summary of Results
Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to test a series of alternative TDI
models. The best-fitting model (Model 6) indicated two distinct factors, which resembled
idiosyncratic and combinatory dimensions. The idiosyncratic factor was defined by TDI
categories characterized by overly-abstract, self-referential, and stilted responses. In
contrast, categories loading on the combinatory factor reflect a style of responding that is
conceptually organized, but perceptually-dominated, over-embellished and thematically
bizarre.
Figure 4 presents a synthesized illustration of significant results. Overall, the
baseline model, with the specification of CPZ as a covariate of Negative Affect,
accounted for 11% of the total variance of Idiosyncratic Thinking and 3% of variance of
Combinatory Thinking. Negative Affect emerged as the strongest predictor of
Idiosyncratic Thinking (r = .27). This effect was comparable in men (r = .22) and women
(r = .36), but differed as a function of Family History; Negative Affect had a significantly
stronger effect on Idiosyncratic Thinking in those with a Family History of psychosis (r =
.37) compared to those without (r = .02). Family History also moderated the effect of
Age-at-Onset on Idiosyncratic Thinking, such that earlier onset predicted more severe
scores in the familial (r = -.17), but not sporadic, group (r = .09). None of these
predictors (Negative Affect, Age-at-Onset, and Family History) were significantly related
to Combinatory Thinking, with no sex-specific effects.
While Age-at-Onset had no effect on Negative Affect in the full sample, this
relationship was significantly moderated by sex, with earlier onset associated with greater
Negative Affect in women (r = -.11), but lower Negative Affect in men (r = .13). Family
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History of psychosis was also a significant predictor of Negative Affect (r = -.12) in the
full sample; however, when estimated for each sex separately, was found to be a malespecific effect (M: r = -.16; F: r = .08). Negative Affect was positively correlated with
CPZ dose, the magnitude of which was greater in women (r = .19) than men (r = .08).
Due to sex differences in structural relationships, the variance in Idiosyncratic Thinking
explained by the model was greater for women (16%) compared to men (8%). Similarly,
given the moderating effects of Family History, variance in Idiosyncratic Thinking was
better explained for those with a Family History of psychosis (19%) than those without
(1%). There were no differences in Combinatory Thinking among groups.
DSM diagnosis was a significant predictor of Idiosyncratic Thinking, explaining
7% of unique variance when entered into the full model compared to 9% of the variance
when estimated independently. Thus, the portion of variance explained by diagnosis was
largely independent of other predictors in the model; this includes Family History, Ageat-Onset, and Negative Affect, which, contrary to expectations, were found to be
unrelated to diagnosis. This was also true of Combinatory Thinking, which we expected,
based on previous research, to be associated with bipolar disorder, but did not differ by
diagnostic group. Sex had a moderate effect on diagnosis, such that women were
significantly more likely to hold a diagnosis of bipolar disorder and men SZ. However,
the effects of diagnosis on model variables did not differ as a function of sex.
Structural relationships were found to differ between non-affective
(schizophrenia) and affective psychosis (schizoaffective and bipolar) diagnoses. Overall,
there was a pattern of more robust effects in the schizophrenia group compared to
affective psychosis group. These differences in magnitude are likely due to the generally
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higher severity of TD in the SZ group, contributing to a broader range of TDI scores.
Family History of psychosis was significantly associated with earlier onset and greater
Negative Affect, and Idiosyncratic Thinking in probands with non-affective psychosis,
but had no effect for those with a diagnosis of affective psychosis. Similarly, the effects
of Age-at-Onset and Negative Affect on Idiosyncratic Thinking were specific to
schizophrenia, as was the relationship between CPZ and Negative Affect. Due to the
differences in structural relationships, the model accounted for considerably more
variance in Idiosyncratic Thinking for probands diagnosed with non-affective (24%),
compared to affective (6%), psychosis.
Figure 4

79

DISCUSSION
Bleuler saw thought disorder as the core defining feature of psychotic phenomena,
reflective of the “splitting of the psychic functions” that occurred when, in the process of
thinking, one’s ideas and feelings disconnect, becoming fragmented and competing
functions. This view was echoed by Meehl (1962), who called thought disorder the
“diagnostic bell ringer” for schizophrenia, which for him, was exemplified by the
comment, “naturally I’m growing my father’s hair.” While Meehl cautioned that the
presence of a single symptom is inadequate grounds on which to infer a nosology, he saw
thought disorder as a “rare exception,” which itself was pathognomonic of schizophrenia.
Interest in thought disorder as the conceptual core of psychosis diminished with
rise of the modern DSM system, shifting focus to more clearly-defined and readilyobserved indicators that would enhance the reliability of psychodiagnosis. The last
several decades have seen mounting criticism of the DSM framework, prompting a
movement to reform our scientific paradigm. At current, the pendulum appears to be
swinging back towards a dimension-based approach to classification and study.
With this shift, revisiting the significance of thought disorder in the
conceptualization and study of psychosis is not only warranted, but timely. Theoretical
and empirical foundations of thought disorder have supported it as a construct with a high
degree of specificity (e.g., compared to hallucinations, which are believed to have highly
diverse causal pathways). Thus, research in this area has the potential to elucidate robust
etiological links, which, in turn, could inform individualized, effective intervention
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approaches. The primary aim of the current study was to begin to disentangle the
phenomenological and etiological heterogeneity of TD, through the application of a
dimension-based, multifactorial, transdiagnostic approach. Above all, results illustrated
the immense complexity of TD, in terms of both qualitative variability and the diverse,
interactional sources of influence.
Much research on TD, particularly through the 1970s and 1980s, focused on its
significance as a diagnostic marker. More recent work has explored broader scientific
questions (e.g., regarding the cognitive and psychological underpinnings of TD), but has
done so within the confines of diagnostic categories. We were interested in exploring the
association between diagnosis and TD in order to better understand what diagnosis is, and
is not, telling us about TD. Consistent with previous research, we found that diagnosis
did account for differences in TD, with the SZ group exhibiting the highest severity of
idiosyncratic thinking compared to SZA or BP. However, the interactions among
demographic and clinical variables illustrated a much more complex and interesting
picture of TD. Of note is the prominent role of negative affect, reminding us of the
fundamental link thinking and feeling, even among individuals historically believed to
have no emotion.
The data demonstrate a pattern of associations among family psychiatric history,
age-at-onset, negative affect, and idiosyncratic thinking, suggestive of a developmental
process specific to idiosyncratic thinking. This parallels findings from a diverse body of
research that has explored the familial nature of thought disorder (Johnston & Holzman,
1979; Docherty et al., 1999; Wynne & Singer, 1965). Across genetics, family linkage,
and social-learning studies, using a range of measurement approaches, familial forms of
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TD have consistently been characterized by idiosyncratic ideation, language, and
reasoning. This has been explained from biological, psychological, and social
perspectives, although the exact mechanisms remain unclear. While the current study
does not help to parse out the sources of influence underlying the familial aggregation of
Idiosyncratic Thinking, it does shed light on the broader developmental process.
While family psychopathology is not analogous to family TD, they have been
found to be highly correlated and both predictive of proband TD (Singer & Wynne,
1965). Family History had no direct effect on Idiosyncratic Thinking in our sample, but
shared an interesting association with Negative Affect. In those with a Family History of
psychosis, Negative Affect was not only more intense, but strongly associated with the
severity of Idiosyncratic Thinking. In order to interpret this, we must first consider the
meaning of Negative Affect as it was measured in this study—in the content of
Rorschach responses.
Traditionally, affective content on the Rorschach, whether attributed affective
qualities to the inkblot (e.g., “a menacing bat”) or in reference to one’s own emotional
state, is thought to reflect a marked loss of distance from the stimuli, indicative of severe
cognitive disturbance (Rappaport et al., 1946). In individuals with psychosis, this has
been shown to occur in the context of self-referential responses, in which the intrusion of
affect is tied to the “intermingling” of personal material, interfering with the perceptual
process (Harrow & Prosen, 1978). While the influence of intermingling was not
empirically assessed, our qualitative analysis revealed a striking patterns of distressing,
personalized responses in those protocols with extreme Negative Affect scores.
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The pattern observed among Family History, Negative Affect, and Idiosyncratic
Thinking can be interpreted from a social-psychodynamic framework. From this
perspective, cognitive and affective capabilities develop in childhood, as a function of the
parent-child relationship. It is these interpersonal transactions that shape the way in
which we perceive and make sense of surroundings, form concepts, process and modulate
affect, and construct an understanding of the self and others. When these early
relationships do not provide the opportunity to establish a shared perspective or present
inaccurate or inconsistent feedback about perceptual and emotional experience, the child
may not develop an organized, stable representation of the self and world. The work of
Wynne and Singer (1965) provides compelling support for this theory, linking parental
disturbances in focusing attention, communicating, and interpersonal relating to the
development of TD, as well as psychosis risk more broadly.
Disorganization in family relations and communication is also a predictor of
affective disturbances, associated with poor modulation of negative affect in both
individuals with and without psychosis (Read & Gumley, 2008; Morris et al., 2007).
Communication deviance within families has been found to predict a range of affectrelated outcomes, including poor eye contact, avoidance of emotions, and higher levels of
distress (Miklowitz & Stackman, 1992). Families characterized as having a high level of
CD have also been shown to exhibit greater cognitive deterioration during periods of
emotional arousal, including difficulty with attention and concentration (Lewis et al.,
1981).
This interpretation aligns with Bleuler’s early conceptualization, in which the
loosening of associations between thought and affective processes, and the dominance of

83

inner life was the core of psychosis (Bleuler, 1911; Harrow & Prosen, 1978). A common
notion is echoed in Vygotsky’s model of cognitive development, which he believed to be
a largely social process, founded in cooperative and collaborative dialogue with
caregivers. It was also at the core of his theory of psychosis, in which he describes “a
separation of […] emotional expressions from the concepts with which they are closely
associated. Taken together, this provides a strong theoretical framework through which to
understand the relationship between distressing affect and TD.
This interpretation of the data also corresponds with the stress sensitivity theory
of psychosis, which has been one of the leading etiological models for many years
(Walker & Diforio, 1997). Related research has consistently demonstrated that
individuals with psychosis have a lower threshold for and heightened response to stress
(Docherty et al., 1996). This is particularly true in familial psychosis, which has been
linked to higher responsivity to emotional, interpersonal, and perceptual stimuli
(Lancaster et al., 2010; Myin-Germeys & VanOs, 2006). In regards to the relationship
between affect and TD, Docherty (1996) found that, when faced with emotionally
provocative stimuli, individuals with a Family History of psychosis exhibited heightened
reactivity, resulting in significant deterioration in the clarity of their language. While we
cannot assume that a Family History of psychosis is analogous with disorganization of
family communication or attachment, the commonalities among these two lines of
research suggest that they are overlapping constructs.
The Role of Age-at-Onset and Sex.
Age-at-onset also had an interesting pattern of associations within the model,
lending further support to the developmental interpretation. Earlier onset age was
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associated with a higher severity of idiosyncratic disturbances, which is consistent with a
large body of evidence linking early onset to an overall more severe form of psychosis,
including higher levels of TD (Kao et al., 2010). Interestingly, earlier onset has been
found to characterize familial psychosis, a finding that was replicated in the current data
(Husted, Greenwood, & Bassett, 2006; Kendler & MacLean, 1990). Individuals with a
Family History of psychosis have been shown to have a significantly earlier age-at-onset
than those with no Family History (Esterberg & Compton, 2012; Gorwood et al., 1995;
Malaspina et al., 2000). While generally explained as evidence of genetic liability, the
relationship between Family History and onset can also be interpreted within the context
of a psychosocial process. That is, the magnitude of relational and attachment
disorganization may be more pronounced in families with psychosis, which could lead
the child to develop less stable, cohesive mental representations that put them at
heightened risk for psychosis earlier in life.
Age-at-onset did not differ as a function of sex, which was unexpected given the
well-established evidence that men develop psychosis an average of 5 to 10 years earlier
than women; while this finding is most consistently reported in schizophrenia research
(Goldstein & Lewine, 2000), it has also been replicated in samples with affective
psychosis (Kennedy et al., 2005; Welham, Thomis, & McGrath, 2004) and sub-clinical
psychosis (Spawen et al., 2003). Perhaps the most surprising finding that emerged from
the data was the sex difference in the Age-at-Onset on Negative Affect in men and
women. The intensity of negative affective was associated with later onset in men and
earlier onset in women. We know that, in males, schizophrenia is characterized by earlier
onset and restricted affect (Anglin et al., 2009; Lewine, 1981; Resend, Viglione, & de
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Lima Argimon, 2009; Salem & Kring, 1998). Women, on the other hand, typically have a
later onset, along with more intense experience and expression of affect (Anglin et al.,
2009). However, women with earlier onset been shown to present with clinical features
similar to typical-onset men (Gureje & Bamidele, 1998). While this would suggest earlier
onset to be predictive of lower emotionality in both men and women, findings come from
diagnosis-based research, which may not apply to the current sample.
Another possible explanation for this relates to the course of psychosis. In
schizophrenia, negative affect has been shown to increase the longer one has lived with
symptoms and spent hospitalized; this includes anger, fear, and guilt (Suslow et al.,
2003). Because men tend to experience earlier onset and a more severe, persistent course
of psychosis, we might expect to see more intense negative affect in men compared to
women over time.
Strengths and Limitations
The methodological approaches used in this research are, in many ways, unique.
The use of the LIWC to assess negative affect in Rorschach responses was novel; while
preliminary support for construct validity was demonstrated, we recognize that questions
may remain about psychometrics. Second, as argued throughout this paper, the
information contained in categorical diagnosis is inherently limited. Thus, despite the
rigor with which family psychiatric history was assessed, it is a flawed marker of family
differences. Given the limited specificity of groups, we must be careful not to overinterpret the significance of Family History in the model. While results suggest that
something is going on in psychotic families, what exactly that is, is purely speculative.
Parsing out the specific mechanisms at work would be a worthwhile aim for future
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research. Given recent work on early adversity and attachment disorganization, exploring
the effects of these factors within the developmental model would be particularly
interesting.
with potential implications for how we interpret and generalize the current findings.
Finally, results are based on a predominantly white, well-educated, middle- to
upper-class sample, which is not representative of the broader population. This is an
important caveat, given that psychosis is more prevalent in low-income areas. Clinical
features of psychosis have also been shown to differ in minority groups, including a
higher preponderance of paranoia in African American men, which is linked to the degree
of discrimination experienced. If poverty and discrimination are indeed risk factors of
psychosis, as research suggests, then the developmental pathways underlying TD might
look very different across sociocultural groups.
Overall, these limitations are outweighed by the strengths of the study, including
the large sample size, equal representation of men and women, and novel methodological
approach.
Implications & Future Directions
The broad implications of this research relate to how we approach the
classification and study of psychosis. Broad diagnostic categories collapse important
aspects of individual difference and variation, leading critical relationships to be
overlooked. The dimensional framework presented a complex, interactional view of the
data, revealing a pattern of relationships among variables that pointed to a developmental
process. Such a nuanced, multidimensional perspective is more representative of human
experience and thus better apt to elucidate links between psychotic phenomena and
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diverse sources of influence. Shifting towards a constructivist paradigm has the potential
to facilitate deeper understanding of the complex nature of psychosis. Related to this, the
approach embodied in the current study supports a phenomenological, developmental,
and psychological perspective of psychosis—something that has historically been
underrepresented and undervalued in science and clinical work.
With regards to clinical work, dimensional research has the potential to provide
detailed, precise information about the structure and nature of psychosis, which is a
critical step in the development of individualized treatments. At present, antipsychotic
medication remains the first, often only, treatment for psychosis, despite accumulating
evidence that calls into question the efficacy and long-term safety of these drugs (Bolla,
Lehtinen, Cullberg, & Ciompi, 2009; Harrow & Jobe, 2007). This reactive, one-size-fitsall approach of treatment is a direct consequence of the categorical, medical model,
which has worked to simplify how we conceptualize and treat psychosis.
The dimensional framework has potential to shift attention back to a
phenomenological view and bring with it an emphasis on proactive, person-centered
approaches to treatment. Our findings draw attention to possible mechanisms of TD that
would be feasible targets of psychosocial treatment. This includes affective reactivity,
which, if it indeed has an exacerbating influence on TD, could be a viable mechanism of
change for future interventions. Given a host of empirically-supported psychosocial
interventions for affect regulation currently available, adapting this approach for TD
would be a feasible and potentially fruitful endeavor.
Another important, albeit indirect, implication relates to the implementation of
prevention efforts. The current results add to an already large body of evidence
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suggesting that children in families with psychosis are at increased risk for a range of
psychological problems (Miklowitz & Stackman, 1992; Wynne, 1994;). Regardless of the
relative influences of biological and environmental causes, psychosis, like any other
psychological, social, or medical problem one might face, is an undeniable source of
stress for the individual and their family. Further, because people with psychosis tend to
have a higher sensitivity to stress and lack the personal resources needed to cope
adaptively, the experience of psychosis itself has the potential to perpetuate further
psychosocial stress. Unfortunately, traditional treatment models often fail to appreciate
and adequately address the personal, social, and relational ramifications of psychosis,
such as the impact of hospitalization on one’s family (including children) and personal
identity (Holden & Lewine, 1982).
Not surprisingly, family interventions have been associated with remarkable
outcomes, in terms of reducing subjective distress, reestablishing social roles, and
reducing relapse (Alahen et al., 2000). The overarching perspective of these approaches
is that psychosis develops within the social system, through a complex, interactive
process, reciprocally determined by the interplay of self-environment factors (Aderhold
& Gottwalz, 2004). With this is the assumption that psychosis is phenomenologically
complex and understandable in the context of the unique dynamics of the family system.
Despite the effectiveness of family treatment, such approaches are not widely
available. Addressing such issues more directly across mental health services, in addition
to increasing availability of family-based treatment, could help to reduce the psychosocial
risk factors for children in families with psychosis.
Conclusion
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Thought disorder is the central defining feature of psychosis. Thus, disturbances
in thinking represent a unique and promising pathway through which to understand the
nature of psychotic phenomena. Exploring this from a dimensional perspective has
potential to contribute to a more comprehensive and integrative model of psychosis,
which has implications for both science and clinical work.
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APPENDIX A
Thought Disorder Index

ASSOCIATIVE LOOSENING

Level of Deviance
.25

.50

.75

Inappropriate Distance
Responses seem to be dictated
insufficiently by the task at hand;
rather, they are heavily
influenced by personal
associations

Looseness
Subject responds with
ideas that are either
unrelated or arbitrarily or
tangentially related.
Associations are
embellished in an
idiosyncratic manner and
may flow rapidly with no
focus of conversation.
The original point is lost.

Fluidity
A loss of object
constancy due to
the subject’s
perception of the
world in a highly
unstable way.

Clang
The response is limited to a
single, clear-cut usage or
rhyming or alliteration.
Determined by sound rather than
word usage.

1.0

Perseveration
A poor-form response that is
repeated at least three times on
consecutive cards

DISORGANIZED THINKING

Relationship Verbalization
Subject either repeats a response
previously giver of offers a new
response, but relates the present
response to the former one.
Vagueness
Response conveys no clear
meaning; can include both
meandering speeches as well as
excessively short, cryptic
statements that carry hardly any
specific information

Confusion
Subject does not appear
to be sure what s/he is
saying, thinking, or
perceiving or appears to
be disoriented about time,
place, or person

Word-Finding Difficulty
The search for a word that the
subject appears to know but on
which s/he is blocking
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Incoherence
A response that is not
only unrelated to the
task, but is completely
impossible for the
examiner to
understand in any
context

Level of Deviance

IDIOSYNCRATIC
VERBALIZATION

COMBINATORY
THINKING

.25

.50

Incongruous
Fabulized Combination
Combination
Percept and related ideas
Single details of a blot that
are condensed into
are contiguous with each
conclusions that violate
other are merged into a
reality; considerations
single response.
about relationships
Participant imparts too
between images, blot
much reality to the images.
qualities, and objects.

.75

1.0

Confabulation
Subject carries to an
extreme an elaborative
ideational tendency that
extends the percept
beyond the bounds of
reality constraints.

Contamination
Two separate,
unrelated percepts
are merged into one.

Idiosyncratic
Autistic Logic
Symbolism
Subject justifies a
The use of concrete
response by rationalizing
images or blot color to
it with a “because”
represent abstract ideas is statement that is illogical
scored when such
or based on private
symbolism is
autistic reasoning
idiosyncratic and is given processes rather than on
with an air of reality
conventional, logical
reasoning.
Peculiar
Queer
Odd words or phrases that
On continuum with
may have a recognizable peculiar but more severe.
meaning but do not fit the
Examiner is generally
context in which they are
uncertain about what is
used; quaint, idiosyncratic,
meant by the word or
or private meaning
phrase
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Absurd
Almost totally arbitrary;
bears little resemblance
to objective reality.
Scorer is unable to form
an idea about the source
of the response.

Neologisms
New word
responses that could
be actual words,
except that they are
not.

APPENDIX B

Summary of Literature on Diagnostic Differences in Thought Disorder
Characteristics
DIAGNOSTIC GROUP

Study
Breakey &
Goodell
(1972)
Andreasen
& Powers
(1974)
Andreasen
(1979b)

Measure

Schizophrenia

Schizoaffective

BGT

under-inclusion

(-)

OST; PT

under-inclusive
thinking

(-)

TLC

poverty of speech,
poverty of speech
content

(-)

TLC

poverty of speech,
poverty of speech
content

(-)

TLC

negative TD

(-)

positive TD

(-)

OST; PT

rate of relapse 4 years
post hospitalization
compared to other
psychotic and nonpsychotic disorders

TLC

global TD

(-)

pressure of speech

(-)

TDI

idiosyncratic/autistic
thinking, absurdity,
confusion

Depressed:
resembled SZ
Manic:
resembled manic

combinatory
thinking

(-)

TDI

disorganization,
confusion, deviant
verbalizations

(-)

combinatory with
“humor, flippancy,
and playfulness.”

Andreasen
(1984)

Harvey et al.
(1984)
Harrow &
Marengo
(1986)
Resnick &
Oltmanns
(1984)
Shenton et
al. (1987)
Solovay et
al. (1987)
Ragin &
Oltmanns
(1987)
Braff et al.
(1988)
Jampala et
al. (1989)

TLC

PT

Mania
conceptual overinclusion,
idiosyncratic
thinking
over-inclusive
thinking
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(-)

(-)

pressure of speech,
derailment,
poverty of speech,
tangentiality,
circumstantiality
illogicality, loss of
goal
tangentiality,
derailment,
(-)
incoherence,
illogicality,
pressure of speech

Poverty of speech, derailment, loss of goal
similar to manics; reduction in derailment pressure of speech
& loss of goal over time than manic
Severity of idiosyncratic
thinking equivalent to
depressed group at
baseline
tangentiality,
neologisms, private word

Depression

(-)

¯TD than all other
groups

(-)

(-)

reduction in
idiosyncratic thinking
at discharge compared
to SZ

(-)

flight of ideas

(-)

Cuesta &
Peralta
(1993)

Docherty et
al. (1996)

TLC
SAPS
SANS

CDI

usage, paraphasias,
driveling (i.e. poverty of
content), non-sequiturs
(i.e. looseness)
poverty of speech,
poverty of speech
content, illogicality,
tangentiality,
perseveration,
global alogia (SANS)
unclear references

Manic:
pressure of
speech,
clanging

(-)

(-)

(-)

speech output,
ambiguous word
meanings

(-)

association
¯ rates of TD remission
between the  rates of TD remission in non-SZ psychosis
Severity
over 7-year period
course of TD and
Ratings
(MDD, bipolar, NOS) than SZ and SZA
compared to SZA group
psychotic
symptoms
Wilcox et al.
TD prevalence in
(2000)
psychotic- vs. nonpsychotic depression
TLC
(-)
(-)
(-)
Negative TD most
prominent in both
groups
Vaever et al.
idiosyncratic
(2005)
symbolism, fluidity,
absurdity, confabulation,
autistic logic,
TDI
(-)
(-)
(-)
contamination; total
score compared to those
with “other” diagnoses
and those without mental
illness.
Note: BGT = Bannister’s Grid Test; OST = Object Sorting Test; PT = Proverbs Test; TLC = Thought, Language, &
Communication Scale; TDI = Thought Disorder Index; SANS = Scale for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms in
Schizophrenia; SAPS = Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms in Schizophrenia; CDI = Communication
Disturbances Index; (–) = group not included in study
Marengo &
Harrow
(1997)
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assistants. Analyzed and interpreted data; presented findings

May 2010 ̵
June 2011

University of Maryland, College Park, MD, Clinical Research Associate
Supervisor: Jack Blanchard, Ph.D.
Collaboration to Advance Negative Symptom Assessment in Schizophrenia
PIs: Jack Blanchard, Ann Kring (Berkeley), Bill Horan (UCLA), Raquel Gur
(UPenn)
National Institute of Mental Health-funded, multisite project to evaluate the
reliability and validity of a new negative symptom assessment instrument, the
Clinical Assessment Interview for Negative Symptoms (CAINS). Recruited
participants from the University of Maryland Medical System community mental
health clinics and Baltimore Veterans Administration. Administered structured
diagnostic and symptom interviews, neuropsychological and performance-based
assessments. Scored and managed data; coded interviews from other sites to
evaluate inter-rater reliability. Attended weekly assessment supervision and
didactics
Investigating Cognitive Models of Negative Symptoms in Schizophrenia
PIs: Shannon Couture, Ph.D. & Melanie Bennett, Ph.D.
VA-funded pilot study examining how perceptions of one’s self, illness, and
environment relate to negative symptoms. Presented study to clinic staff at
recruitment sites; recruited participants, collected and managed data. Conducted
diagnostic interviews, symptom assessments, cognitive testing, questionnaires, and
distress-tolerance/persistence tasks
Adapting Motivational Interviewing for Persons with Schizophrenia
PI: Melanie Bennett, Ph.D.
VA-funded pilot study focused on adapting motivational interviewing to suit
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individual differences in persons diagnosed with schizophrenia. Carried out
administrative tasks, prepared study protocol and consent documents for
Institutional Review Board approval
RESEARCH ASSESSMENT EXPERIENCE
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM Disorders, Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale, Scale for
Assessment of Negative Symptoms, Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms, MATRICS
Consensus Cognitive Battery, Brief Cognitive Assessment Tool for Schizophrenia, UCSD
Performance-based Skills Assessment ̵ Brief, Simpson-Angus Scale, Calgary Depression Scale
for Schizophrenia, Chapman Anhedonia Scales, Internalized Stigma of Mental Illness Inventory,
Rorschach Inkblot Test, Thought Disorder Index
PUBLICATIONS
Waford, R., Lewine, R., Robertson, C., & Hart, M. (submitted). Negative and positive affect are
differentially associated with characteristics of thought disorder in schizophrenia.
Manuscript submitted to the Journal of Abnormal Psychology.
Hart, M. & Lewine, R. (pending submission). Toward a dimensional and integrative
understanding of psychopathology: Implications for a multifactorial, clinical model of
thought disorder
Hart, M. & Lewine, R. (pending submission). The nature of cognitive impairment in
schizophrenia: A multiple-groups confirmatory factor analysis of the WAIS-R
Hart, M. & Lewine, R. (unpublished manuscript). The moderating effect of family history on the
relationship between executive dysfunction and thought disorder in schizophrenia.
Lewine, R. & Hart, M. (unpublished manuscript). David Robeson Morgan: A case study that
raises questions about the role of frontal lobes in complex cognitive processes.
PROFESSIONAL PRESENTATIONS
Martin, M., Lewine, R., & Hart, M. (October 2015). Typical and atypical gender roles in
individuals with schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder. Poster presented at the 2015
annual meeting of the Society for Research in Psychopathology, New Orleans, LA.
Hart, M. & Lewine, R. (October 2015). Personalized associations and affective responsivity as
predictors of thought disorder on the Rorschach. Abstract accepted for the 2015 annual
meeting of the Society for Research in Psychopathology, New Orleans, LA (unable to
present).
Hart, M., Waford, R., Robertson, C., & Lewine, R. (September 2014). Exploring the relationship
between affect and thought disorder in schizophrenia. Poster presented at the 2014
annual meeting of the Society for Research in Psychopathology, Evanston, IL.
Waford, R., Robertson, C., Hart, M., & Lewine, R. (September 2014). Does affective valence
moderate thought disorder severity in schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder ? Poster
presented at the 2014 annual meeting of the Society for Research in Psychopathology,
Evanston, IL.
Hart, M., & Lewine, R. (September 2013). Examining neuropsychological heterogeneity in
schizophrenia through a broadened definition of family history. Abstract accepted for the
2013 annual meeting of the Society for Research in Psychopathology, Oakland, CA
(unable to present).
Hart, M. & Lewine, R. (October 2012). Reexamining the relationship between domains of
neurocognitive functioning and thought disorder in schizophrenia. Poster presented at the
annual meeting of Society for Research in Psychopathology, Ann Arbor, MI.
Waford, R., Robertson, C., Hart, M., & Lewine, R. (October 2012). Does affective valence
moderate thought disorder severity in schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder? Poster
presented at the annual meeting of Society for Research in Psychopathology, Ann Arbor,
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MI.
Robertson, C., Lewine, R., Waford, R., & Hart, M. (October 2012). Examining the efficacy of
subgrouping by FFM Personality Traits in Schizophrenia: An exploratory investigation.
Poster presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Research in Psychopathology,
Ann Arbor, MI.
Hart, M., Bennett, M., Couture, S., Blanchard, J. (September 2011). The relationship between
persistence, neurocognitive performance, and negative symptoms in schizophrenia.
Poster presented at the annual meeting of Society for Research in Psychopathology,
Boston, MA.
Hart, M., Petrow, A., Bennett, M. (May 2011). Internalized stigma in a sample of individuals
with schizophrenia. Poster presented at the annual University of Maryland School of
Medicine Research Day, Baltimore, MD.
TEACHING EXPERIENCE
Fall 2015;
Spring 2015;
Fall 2014
Spring 2013

Fall 2012

Introduction to Psychology, Teaching Assistant
Attended lectures and proctored biweekly examinations for two course sections of
300 students; scored all examinations; generated grade distributions and statistics;
uploaded and managed grades through online grade management system,
Blackboard.
Psychology of Learning, Lab Instructor
Planned and facilitated weekly lab meetings for two sections of 30 students;
activities included conducting experiments in a virtual rat-training program,
watching video clips and discussing illustrated learning principles; graded weekly
written assignments and term papers; managed online course page through
Blackboard
Forensic Psychology, Teaching Assistant
Attended all lectures, graded tests and papers for 150 students
Psychology of Personality, Teaching Assistant
Attended lectures and learned course material; met with students on an individual
basis as needed to review exams or discuss course material; graded
exams/assignments for class of 150 students

Spring 2012

Experimental Psychology, Lab Instructor
Attended all lectures, planned and facilitated weekly lab meetings for two
sections of 30 students; facilitated group exercises and activities related to the
scientific method; conducting test review sessions; graded weekly written
assignments and term papers; managed online course page through Blackboard

Fall 2011

Psychology of Personality, Teaching Assistant
Attended all lectures; provided additional support to students on an individual
basis; collaborated in the development of exams; scored all exams and managed
grade database

SERVICE EXPERIENCE
2012 ̵ 2015

Peer Mentor for incoming graduate students

2012

Conducted free memory screenings for the community for National Memory
Screening Day

2012 ̵ 2014

Assisted in planning and coordination of admissions interviews for program
applicants

125

2011

Society for Research in Psychopathology: 2011 Student Contributor, Publication
Committee

2005- 2006

Volunteered at My Sister’s Place (Baltimore, MD), a day program that provides
shelter, resources, and support to women and children struggling with
homelessness and domestic abuse. Responsibilities included planning and
conducting activities, serving meals, and assisting with administrative tasks.

2004 - 2005

Volunteered at Frederick Ozanam House (Baltimore, MD), a half-way-house for
men working toward independent living after being incarcerated,
institutionalized, or homeless. Responsibilities included planning and carrying out
activities and social events, as well as providing support and companionship to
members.

2003 - 2004

Volunteered at Baltimore Reads Inc. (Baltimore, MD) as a tutor and mentor for
inner-city elementary school children experiencing academic and emotional
difficulties, in addition to significant environmental stressors (e.g., poverty,
neighborhood violence, family problems)

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES AND AFFILIATIONS
American Psychological Association ̵ student member
Division 12, Society of Clinical Psychology
Division 29, Division of Psychotherapy
Kentucky Psychological Association ̵ student member
Society for Research in Psychopathology ̵ student member
International Society for Psychological and Social Approaches to Psychosis ̵ student member
Maryland Psychological Association for Graduate Students ̵ student member
RELEVANT WORK EXPERIENCE
November 2009 ̵
May 2010

Special Education Teacher
Kennedy Krieger Institute, Baltimore, MD
Created, facilitated, and evaluated lesson plans in compliance with
Maryland State Department of Education standards; administered and
interpreted informal student assessments; composed and presented
Individualized Educational Plans (I.E.P.s); collaborated with
professional staff in order to implement, monitor, and evaluate the
effectiveness of Behavioral Intervention Plans

May 2007 ̵
November 2009

Teaching Assistant
Kennedy Krieger Institute, Baltimore, MD
Supported lead teacher in lesson planning, instruction, student
assessment, and classroom organization; responsible for grading
assignments, recording behavioral data, and maintaining student
records; implemented behavioral and crisis intervention plans; worked
as part of a multidisciplinary team representing education, social work,
psychology, psychiatry, occupational therapy, speech pathology, music
therapy, and nursing to ensure coordination of services for students

August 2006 ̵
May 2007

Therapeutic Behavior Aide
Kennedy Krieger Institute, Baltimore, MD
Worked one-on-one with a student with Fetal Alcohol Syndrome in a
non-public special education high school; responsible for adapting
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lesson plans and assignments to fit her needs and abilities; assisted in
the development and implementation of behavioral intervention plans
and tracked behavioral data; collaborated with teachers, social worker,
psychologist, and psychiatrist to coordinate care
PROFESSIONAL REFERENCES
Richard R. J. Lewine, Ph.D.
Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences
University of Louisville
Louisville, KY 40292
(502) 852-3243
rich.lewine@louisville.edu
Benjamin Mast, Ph.D.
Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences
University of Louisville
Louisville, KY 40292
(502) 852-3280
b.mast@louisville.edu
Jack J. Blanchard, Ph.D.
Department of Psychology
University of Maryland
College Park, MD 20742
(301) 405-8438
jblancha@umd.edu
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